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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1953-1954*
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS
THE SCOPE AND EXTENT of the activities which a domestic corpo-
ration may lawfully undertake has been fixed, in the main, by
statute' but special regulations may apply to particular classes of
corporations. 2 When the corporation is one which has been formed
to carry on professional activities even more stringent regulations
may be imposed to the end that the affairs of the corporation,
particularly as they may affect third persons, shall be carried on
only by those who possess professional competence.3 There is
reason to believe, however, that the extent to which a corporation
may engage in the practice of architecture has been broadened
by the decision attained in the case of Continental Paper Grading
Company v. Howard T. Fischer & Associates, Inc.,4 wherein a
declaratory judgment was sought by way of construction of the
language of the Illinois Architectural Act,5 a statute which pur-
* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year, but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that
of the judicial year, embracing from 415 Ill. 182 to 3 Ill. (2d) 116; from 350 Il.
App. 590 to 3 Ill. App. (2d) 118. No amendments or additions were made to
statutory law during this period as the General Assembly was not in session.
1 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.3, for a statement of the purposes
for which a general business corporation may be organized.
2 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 443, regarding agricultural co-
operative associations, with ibid., Ch. 32, § 496.1, relating to credit unions.
3 See for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 36, as to pharmacies.
4 3 I1. App. (2d) 118, 120 N. E. (2d) 577 (1954).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 101/2, § 3.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ports to prohibit corporations from practicing the architect's
profession but permits them to contract for architectural services
provided the chief executive officer of the corporation is a regis-
tered architect and the services are rendered under his personal
direction and supervision. It would seem, in the light of this
statute, that the amount of work which a corporation might under-
take to perform would be limited by the physical capacity of its
chief executive officer but the Appellate Court for the First Dis-
trict did there hold that the rendition of architectural services
might be done under the personal direction and supervision of any
registered architect whether chief executive officer or not and
without regard to whether or not he enjoyed regular employment
with the company. The court did not dwell in particular on the
latter conclusion but the registered architect there concerned,
under whose supervision the work was done, had left the company
shortly after work had been commenced on the plaintiff's con-
struction job and had continued, as an independent contractor, to
supervise work on the project until its completion. The net result
of the case would seem to be that a corporation could expand its
business of providing architectural services by the mere process
of employing additional registered architects.
The independence of a corporation as a separate entity, dis-
tinct from its directors, officers and shareholders, provides a
fundamental premise underlying the law as to corporations. Acts
done by the human beings mentioned, except when properly au-
thorized, do not bind the corporation but may redound to its
benefit, particularly if the corporation acts to accept such benefits.6
The case of Kolin v. Leitch,7 however, suggests that the corpora-
tion may enjoy the benefits of action taken by its directors even
though no adoption or ratification thereof occurs, for the corpora-
tion was there allowed to offer a suggestion of damages arising
from the improper issuance of a temporary injunction although
it had not joined in a motion to vacate the injunction nor partici-
6 Perry v. Nevin Hotel Co., 349 I1. App. 22, 109 N. E. (2d) 810 (1953).
7 351 Ill. App. 66, 113 N. E. (2d) 806 (1953), noted in 32 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW RE-
VIEW 187.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW - 1958-1954
pated in the appeal taken from the denial thereof by the director-
defendants. The court there concerned appears to have considered
the directors and the corporation to be interchangeable personali-
ties, at least for this particular purpose.
A word of warning to corporate officers and directors may be
in order as the result of the federal court decision in Dwyer v.
Tracey" although it does not affirmatively appear that the decision
rendered in that case rests on Illinois law. In the subject case,
the defendant, who occupied the dual role of officer and director,
was hired under a contract of employment for a term of years.
Before the term expired, he was given two new contracts, both
to the disadvantage of the corporation as compared with the origi-
nal contract. In each case the defendant was active, as director,
in securing the adoption of the contracts. Although, as a matter
of contract law, there may have been sufficient consideration pres-
ent to make the succeeding contracts enforcible, the court held
that the defendant had violated his fiduciary duty so it required
him to make restitution for all salary and other advantages re-
ceived in excess of the compensation set in the original contract.
Three other cases are deserving of brief comment. The case
of Gillam v. 661 Sheridan Apartments, Inc.,9 should serve as a
reminder that a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo
may be available as an ancillary remedy in a stockholder's deriva-
tive suit against the corporate officers and directors. The federal
court, in the case of Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc.,10 has now reached
a result in accord with that announced in the earlier Illinois case
of Schmidt v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Company," a case in
which it was decided that a shareholder might bring a stockholder's
derivative suit only upon an order of the court having jurisdiction
of the debtor's estate in the event his corporation has been taken
under the control of a bankruptcy court. It might also be noted
8 118 F. Supp. 289 (1954).
9 1 Ill. App. (2d) 11, 116 N. E. (2d) 91 (1953). A prior illustration may be found
in the case of Forster v. Fruin & Walker Co., 170 Ill. App. 89 (1912).
10210 F. (2d) 908 (1954).
11349 Ill. App. 229, 110 N. E. (2d) 464 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REmrw 3.
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that, in Brothers v. McMahon,12 it was held that a contract for
the purchase of a housing unit in a co-operative apartment to be
built was not a purchase of a "security" within the meaning of
the Illinois Securities Law. 18 That result was achieved, despite
the fact that the purchaser's interest was to be represented by
shares in a corporation or a beneficial interest in a land trust,
inasmuch as the contract was said not to contemplate a sharing
in the profits or income, if any, earned by the defendant con-
struction company.
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Insofar as the law relating to unincorporated business asso-
ciations was concerned, published decisions were relatively rare,
and those adding to, or altering, existing doctrines were practically
non-existent. The year, however, was not a complete loss for the
age-old question as to whether or not a partnership exists was
regarded as determinative in two cases. The first of them, that
of Rizzo v. Rizzo, 14 is novel 15 for the court there found a partner-
ship to exist although there was not even an allegation of any
particular agreement, either oral or written, between the parties.
In that case, the father of the alleged partners had established a
paper business and, as his four sons became old enough, they
each went to work in the family business, being given a share of
the profits as compensation. The father eventually retired from
the business and conveyed the business site to his oldest son by
an absolute deed not supported by any direct consideration. This
son assumed the role of managing partner with the other sons
continuing to work and to receive a share in the profits. From
these facts, and certain other conduct, the court found a partner-
12 351 Ill. App. 321, 115 N. E. (2d) 116 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
13 The case was based on i. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 121Y2, § 97(1). That
statute was later repealed and has now been replaced by the Illinois Securities
Act of 1953. The language thereof defining the term "security" is almost identical.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121/, § 137.1 et seq.
14 3 Ill. (2d) 291, 120 N. E. (2d) 546 (1954).
15 The case does not stand entirely alone for much the same result was attained
in Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 148 Ill. 9, 35 N. E. 383 (1893).
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ship relationship existed. By contrast, in Cook v. Lauten,18 the
relationship was treated as one of master and servant, despite
the existence of an agreement designating the parties as manag-
ing partner and junior partner when it was made to appear that
the junior was to be paid no more than a fixed salary and a bonus,
that the junior could be expelled at the discretion of the managing
partner, and that, in the event of the death of the junior, he
was to have no interest in the business other than a right to
receive any unpaid salary or bonus.
The case of Bakalis v. Bressler17 may serve to emphasize the
close fiduciary relation which exists between partners for it
extended the accompanying duty to cover transactions relating to
leased premises in which the business was conducted as well as
to matters relating to the conduct of the business itself. While
there has been dictum to this effect in other Illinois cases,' no
prior case appears to have reached this precise holding. The court
there imposed a constructive trust over the business premises, for
the benefit of the other partner, following the acquisition of the
property by one partner with his own money accompanied with
an immediate conveyance of the title to the purchaser's wife. The
decision may have been strengthened by the fact that a term in
the business lease provided that, in the event no renewal occurred,
the lessor should own the goodwill and the customer list with the
right to solicit former customers of the business.
An interesting joint venture problem may be found in the
case of Schnackenberg v. Towle, 19 wherein two well-known lawyers
became associated together in the conduct of certain tax refund
proceedings, at a time when one of them was about to become a
judge, under an agreement to the effect that the elected judge
should assume full responsibility, in return for a share of the
attorney's fee, but the active prosecution of the matter should
be handled in the name of and by the other. Following the suc-
10 1 Ill. App. (2d) 255, 117 N. E. (2d) 414 (1954).
17 1 111. (2d) 72, 115 N. E. (2d) 323 (1953).
Is See, for example, Thanos v. Thanos, 313 Ill. 499, 145 N. E. 250 (1924).
19 351 Ill. App. 497, 115 N. E. (2d) 813 (1953). Leave to appeal has been allowed.
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cessful termination of the tax proceedings, the active attorney
collected the fee but refused to give an accounting on the theory
the joint venture was an illegal one inasmuch as the judge's
participation in the matter, so it was said, would involve him in
the practice of law as an attorney in a court in which he had
been commissioned to sit as a judge2 0 and would also operate to
violate constitutional restraints on the conduct of judges. 21 An
accounting was, nevertheless, decreed and the Appellate Court
for the First District affirmed the decision when it noted that
there was an absence of illegality in the agreement. On the first
contention, the court said the several circuit courts of the state
were distinct entities, so a judge of one circuit was not barred
from appearing as a lawyer before a court in another circuit.
22
It was also pointed out that, under Illinois law, a circuit judge,
as such, was not barred from engaging in the private practice of
law outside of his own court.
23
PRIN CIPAL AND AGENT
The time period covered by this survey may be characterized
as revealing a dearth of cases in the field of agency law.24 Although
several cases dealt with problems relating to the payment of
brokerage commissions, only one seems to have any novel aspects.
In Levit v. Bowers,25 the question arose as to whether or not a
property owner who had offered to pay a full commission to any
broker who "successfully negotiated a sale" of the property was
liable for the payment of the commission when a broker produced
a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to buy even though
20 In. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, § 10.
21 11. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 16.
22 As to the wisdom of this practice, see Canon 31 of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Canons of Judicial Ethics.
23 The court cited O'Hare v. Chicago, M. & N. R. Co., 139 Ill. 151, 28 N. E. 923
(1891), and Town of Bruce v. Dickey, 116 Il. 527, 6 N. E. 435 (1886).
24 The case of In re Richmond's Estate, 1 Ill. App. (2d) 310, 117 N. E. (2d) 583
(1954), might be regarded as significant only because the court there relied on a
presumption that an attorney at law, as an officer of the court, has authority to
act for and represent the client he professes to serve. No such presumption would
adhere to the ordinary principal and agency relationship.
25 2 Ill. App. (2d) 343, 119 N. E. (2d) 536 (1954).
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no sale was in fact consummated because the owner refused to
enter into a contract of sale. The Appellate Court for the First
District held that the phrase "successfully negotiated" meant no
more than the carrying out of negotiations which would end in
an offer that met the terms demanded by the seller; that con-
summation of the sale was not required; and that the broker was
entitled to the commission so earned.
LABOR LAW
Concentrated attacks appear to have been made on the con-
stitutionality of statutory enactments by which the state may be
said to have attempted to assure wage earners that they would
be paid a fair and equitable wage. For example, the so-called
"prevailing wage" act,26 one designed to assure workmen em-
ployed under contracts for public works of a wage rate corre-
sponding to that prevailing in the community for similar work,
came under attack in the case of Bradley v. Casey27 but the
Supreme Court upheld the statute against the charge that the
term "prevailing rate of wages" was too vague and indefinite,
hence involved an undue delegation of legislative power. In
contrast to prior decisions, as in Mayhew v. Nelson2s and Reid v.
Smith29 where previous "prevailing wage" acts had been held
unconstitutional for this reason, the court now appears to have
changed its mind in the belief that a prevailing wage rate might
be equal to the market rate or might be commensurate with a
certain level bounded by a customary minimum and maximum,
but at any rate was a term with a well understood meaning. The
court did, however, make it clear that the statute applied only
to employees of private contractors having contracts for public
works and did not require the state, or any other public body,
to pay prevailing wage rates to their employees.30 At the same
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 39s - 1 et seq.
27415 Ill. 564, 114 N. E. (2d) 778 (1953), noted in 1953 Ill. L. Forum 648.
28 346 Il. 381, 178 N. E. 921 (1931).
29 375 Ill. 147, 30 N. E. (2d) 908 (1940).
80 It was indicated that the statute would have been void pro tanto if so applied
for It would then be made to deal with matters not included in the title thereof: Ill.
Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
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time it did find the last paragraph of Section 2 of the statute,3 1
one providing that, in a locality where a collective bargaining
agreement was in effect covering wage rates for similar work,
the collective bargaining rate should be considered to be the
prevailing one, was unconstitutional since it did amount to an
undue delegation of discretionary powers into the hands of private
parties.
The second statutory enactment challenged was the one in-
tended to provide for minimum wage standards for women and
minors.3 2 Again, the Supreme Court, in the case of Vissering
Mercantile Company v. Annunzio,33 parried the attack in an
elaborate opinion, pointing primarily to the fact that oppressive
wages, being those less than the fair value of the services rendered,
constitute an evil likely to affect the health and welfare of women
and children, hence were subject to state regulation. The court
did, however, declare Section 13 of the statute3 4 to be unconsti-
tutional insofar as it provided that all questions of fact arising
under the statute should be decided by the Department of Labor
and purported to forbid judicial review with respect to such ques-
tions for, admitting that the acts of the department in dealing
with minimum wages would be essentially legislative rather than
judicial in character, the denial of all judicial review as to ques-
tions of fact constituted a violation of due process requirements.
Questions pertaining to the applicability of the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act" were the subject of protracted litigation.
In Eutectic Welding Alloys Corporation v. Rauch,3 6 the issue
arose as to whether a sales representative for an out-of-state firm,
assigned a designated territory within the state wherein he was
to seek to obtain orders for the firm's products, was a covered
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 39s- 2. This paragraph was added by
Laws 1951, p. 1493.
32 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 198.1 et seq.
33 1 Ill. (2d) 108, 115 N. E. (2d) 306 (1953). Hershey, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question:- U. S. -, 74 S. Ct. 680, 98 L. Ed. (adv.) 566 (1954).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 198.13.
35 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 300 et seq.
36 1 Ill. (2d) 328, 115 N. E. (2d) 898 (1953).
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employee. The Supreme Court, affirming the lower court, found
that the company exercised sufficient control over the sales repre-
sentative so as to prevent him from being excluded from covered
employment under the provisions of the statute dealing with
independent contractors.3 7 In that connection, the court pointed
to certain provisions in the contract which defined the area of
work, reserved to the company the right to discharge the sales-
man if he handled other lines of products without consent, per-
mitted the cancellation of the contract if the salesman violated
the terms of the agreement, and provided against competition
following termination. The case at hand was distinguished from
the result attained in Aluminum Cooking Utensil Company v.
Gordon38 upon the basis that the contract in that case contained
a specific provision abrogating company control over the sales
representative's activities. Any pronouncements in the last-
mentioned case which differed from those in the principal case
were declared to be expressly overruled. 9
The acute problem of pre-emption of certain activities in the
field of labor relations by an exercise of federal power was, in
one of its aspects, made the subject of judicial determination in
the case of Precision Scientific Company v. International Union
of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.40 The question there arose
as to whether an Illinois state court had jurisdiction to interfere,
by injunctive process, with an allegedly illegal strike called by a
union which, although supposedly Communist-dominated, had been
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the collective
bargaining representative of the plaintiff's employees and had
filed an unfair labor practice charge, pending before the Board,
on the ground the plaintiff had refused to bargain with it. Plain-
tiff admitted that it had refused to recognize the union but
declared it had done so only because of the alleged domination
of the union by Communists. The Appellate Court for the First
37 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 322.
3s 393 I1. 542, 66 N. E. (2d) 4'31 (1946).
39 1 Ill. (2d) 328 at 340, 115 N. E. (2d) 898 at 904.
40 2 Ill. App. (2d) 531, 120 N. E. (2d) 356 (1954).
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District declared that a state court had no power to issue an
injunction in the specific case so long as the strike was peaceful,
since the employer's refusal to recognize the certified union as
collective bargaining agent amounted to an unfair labor practice
over which the Board possessed exclusive jurisdiction. It did say,
however, that a state court would have jurisdiction to restrain the
striking union from acts of violence and intimidation, so the
injunction was affirmed in part.
Employee pension plans, now so common in business and
industry, would seem to be enforcible by the employees only if
they have become the subject of a binding contractual obligation
on the part of the employer. In the event the pension plan, insti-
tuted by the employer, provides that the entire cost of the plan
is to be borne by the employer, that the employer may change
or discontinue the plan, that no employee rights under the plan
should arise until after annuities had been purchased, and then
only against the insurance company with respect to the annuities
so purchased, it would seem that the employer would have no
contractual obligation to maintain the plan. This, at least, was
the holding of the Appellate Court in the case of Hughes v.
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.,41 wherein certain employees had
attempted to obtain specific performance under a pension plan
with intent to force the employer to keep up the purchase of
annuities. The court also held that any benefit from increased
employment stability which the employer would receive from in-
stituting a pension plan of the type mentioned would not give
rise to a promissory estoppel in favor of the employees.
Two other cases dealt with incidental aspects of the employ-
ment relationship. In Stanulus v. Budd,42 the Appellate Court
was called upon to determine whether an untruthful statement by
an employee in his employment application, one to the effect that
he had never been arrested, was sufficient "cause . . . detrimental
to the service" to warrant discharge of the employee in accord-
411 Ill. App. (2d) 514, 117 N. E. (2d) 880 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
42 1 I1. App. (2d) 334, 117 N. E. (2d) 655 (1953). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
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ance with Section 28 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act.
43
The court ruled in the affirmative, stating that an employer had
a right to expect his employee would possess qualities of truth-
fulness and honesty regardless of the type of work which he
would be expected to perform. In the other case, that of Book v.
Napier,44 the Appellate Court reaffirmed the principle that an
employee ought to refrain from activities which would be injurious
to his employer's interests, with a consequent forfeiture of the
right to compensation if the employee should be guilty of gross
misconduct, but it treated the loose talk on the part of the
employee there concerned, designed to emphasize and even exag-
gerate his importance to the business while minimizing the em-
ployer's ability, as not being sufficiently gross misconduct to
warrant a loss of compensation.
WORKKMEN 'S COMPENSATION
One rather unusual factual situation was presented by the
compensation case entitled Hunter Packing Company v. Industrial
CoMmission4' in which case an employee, whose clothing had be-
come dampened while at work, had gone to the toilet room of his
employer and was afterward found dead with his body lying
against an electric heater and his back marked by the presence
of deep burns. The Supreme Court declared therein that a reason-
able inference could be drawn, from the circumstances of the case,
that the injuries arose out of and in the course of the employment
since going to the toilet to meet the demands of nature had to
be considered as an act incidental to the employment relationship.
Much more substantial were the legal questions presented
during the year. A question of first impression was projected in
the case of Arview v. Industrial Commission46 in which case an
employee, who in a prior accident had lost the sight of an eye,
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 328.
443 Il1. App. (2d) 19, 120 N. E. (2d) 244 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
45 1 Il. (2d) 99, 115 N. E. (2d) 236 (1953), noted in 1953 Ill. L. Forum 677.
46415 11. 522, 114 N. E. (2d) 698 (1953).
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sought to recover from his employer for a subsequent independ-
ent accident in which he suffered the loss of several other members
of his body. Compensation was demanded as for a total and
permanent disability as well as for a lifetime pension. The ques-
tion was one as to whether or not these benefits should be paid
from the special fund, created by the Workmen's Compensation
Act,4 7 which was administered by the State Treasurer for the
benefit of handicapped workers or should be borne by the em-
ployer. The Supreme Court determined that the employer was
liable to the employee only for compensation for the loss of a
single member, together with a proper allowance for necessary
medical and hospital services, artificial members, and temporary
total disability, but that the employee should recover, from the
special fund, the difference between the compensation so payable
and the amount due under the statute for a permanent and total
disability together with the accompanying lifetime pension there
provided.
Subrogation and similar issues were also projected by a series
of cases. In Manion v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad
Company,48 a covered employee, injured by a third party while
at work, had been paid workmen's compensation by his employer
but had also filed a common-law action against the third party for
the recovery of damages, in which action the jury returned a
verdict in the employee's favor. On the day this verdict was
returned, the employer filed a petition in the trial court asking
that he be permitted to join in the employee's action and that
he be indemnified, under the judgment, in accordance with former
Section 29 of the statute,49 for the compensation so paid. The
employee-plaintiff moved to strike this petition on the ground the
employer had failed to allege his freedom from being the negli-
gent cause of the plaintiff's injury. The lower court denied the
motion and granted the employer's petition but the Appellate
Court for the Second District reversed, pointing out that Section
47Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq., particularly § 138.7(f).
482 Ill. App. (2d) 191, 119 N. E. (2d) 498 (1954).
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 166. The present statute may be found in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Oh. 48, § 138.5(b).
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29 did not specify the time and manner of determining this con-
dition to the employer's right to indemnity. The mere fact that
the employee had recovered a judgment against a third party was
said not to exclude the possibility that the employer, or one of
the fellow employees, might have negligently contributed to the
injury.50 On the other hand, in Hyland v. 79 West Monroe Cor-
poration,5 the Appellate Court for the First District held it was
proper to deny to an employer the right to file a notice claiming
a lien for benefits paid under the Workmen's Compensation Act
52
in connection with any judgment recovered by the employee
against a third person. It was also there held that the trial court
had the discretionary power to deny the employer the right to
intervene in the employee's common-law action, particularly where
the parties thereto opposed such intervention and the employer
was still paying compensation.
A possible solution to problems of the character thus noted
may be seen in the outcome of the case of Geneva Construction
Company v. Martin Transfer & Storage Company.5 3 That action
had originally been instituted by the employer under the first
paragraph of former Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act which, after the filing of the suit, was declared unconstitu-
tional in another case. 54 The employer, who had paid compensa-
tion, then amended the complaint against the third person who
had caused the employee's injuries to state a cause of action for
subrogation which the Appellate Court for the Second District
upheld on the ground that the general doctrine of subrogation
should be sufficient to enable the employer to maintain such a
suit without regard to the existence, or non-existence, of a statu-
tory provision on the point. As modern views relating to subro-
50 The court also declared that, if the employer proved such freedom, he would be
entitled to full reimbursement and would not be required to share proportionately
in the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the employee in his suit against the
third party.
512 111. App. (2d) 83, 118 N. E. (2d) 636 (1954). Leave to appeal has been denied.
52 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b).
53 351 Ill. App. 289, 114 N. D. (2d) 906 (1953). Leave to appeal has been allowed.
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 166, was declared unconstitutional in
Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), noted in
30 CR:CAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 375.
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gation extend to cover every instance wherein one person, not
being a mere volunteer, has paid a debt for which another is
primarily liable, the court expressed the belief that the principle
should govern the three-cornered relationship between employer,
employee and tort-feasor. 55
Time periods within which accident notices must be given,
and claims filed, have been a frequent source of litigation.
56 It
was said, in Railway Express Agency v. Industrial Commission,
57
however, that the statutory requirement for making application
for compensation within one year after the injury58 could be either
expressly or impliedly waived by the employer. Also possessing
an ameliorating effect is the decision in the case of Union Asbestos
Company v. Industrial Commission,59 a proceeding based on the
Occupational Diseases Act.60 It was there said that an applica-
tion for death benefits on behalf of the dependents of a deceased
employee would be timely and proper,61 if the employee had been
awarded compensation under the statute during his life-time but
had died pending an appeal from such award, provided the
application for death benefits was made within one year from the
date of payment of compensation to the administrator of the
deceased employee's estate following upon a final adjudication
as to the original award.
Interpretation has been provided, by the case of Shell Oil
Company v. Industrial Commission,62 for the proviso contained in
former Section 8(d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 63 as
55 The case also dealt with the right of the employee, after the normal period
of limitation had expired, to join with the employer, by amendment, for the purpose
of enforcing the employee's common-law claim against the third person for the
negligent tort Inflicted. A discussion of this aspect of the case appears below.
See Section III hereof, particularly note 25, first series.
56 See, for example, a note in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAw RirVIEw 287 discussing the
case of International Harvester Co. v Industrial Commission, 410 Ill. 543, 103
N. E. (2d) 109 (1951).
57415 Ill. 294, 114 N. E. (2d) 353 (1953).
58 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.6(c).
59 415 Ill. 367, 114 N. B. (2d) 845 (1953).
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 172.36 et seq.
61 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 172.41(c).
622 Ill. (2d) 590, 119 N. E. (2d) 224 (1954).
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 145(d). The text thereof corresponds with
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 4g, J 138.8 (d).
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amended in 1949, a provision which allows the entry of an award
if an employee should sustain an accidental injury resulting in a
fracture of a vertebra and a loss of function of the back. The
Supreme Court there held that the fracture did not have to be
of an accidental nature for a surgical removal of part of a
vertebra, when necessitated by an accidental injury, would be
sufficient to constitute a fracture within the meaning of the
applicable provision.
One remaining decision, that reached by the Appellate Court
for the First District in the case of Hayes v. Marshall Field &
Company,64 might be noticed. The plaintiff there concerned, a
department store employee, got a cinder or particle of dust in
her eye while a work. She went to the company doctor who
probed her eye and, in so doing, pierced the eyeball and caused
a loss of sight. The plaintiff filed a common-law action for
damages against both the employer and the physician. The court
upheld a dismissal of the suit as to both defendants, declaring
that the injury was one compensable under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. The case is noteworthy because, in a closing para-
graph of the opinion discussing the liability of the doctor, the
court there indicated that the doctor was a co-employee as to
whom the statute made no distinction hence, when the statute
served to bar a common-law action against the employer, it
operated to bar suit against the fellow employee also.
II. CONTRACTS
Relatively little has occurred in the field of general contract
law but the question of whether a written agreement of mutual
release could be considered as an accord and satisfaction was
before the Appellate Court for the First District in the case of
Stoner v. Stoner.' In that case, one brother had, some years
before, obtained a decree for the payment of a large sum of money
64 351 Il1. App. 329, 115 N. E. (2d) 99 (1953), noted in 32 CHIoAGo-KMNT LAW
RLvmW 351.
1351 Il. App. 304, 115 N. E. (2d) 103 (1953), noted in 42 Ill. B. J. 516. Leave
to appeal has been denied.
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against another brother. Three years after the decree, the brothers
met at the office of an attorney and signed a mutual release agree-
ment which recited that certain controversies had arisen between
the brothers; that certain amounts and properties had been ac-
cepted in satisfaction; and that each thereby released the other
from all claims. The controversies referred to related to matters
arising from a family business. At that time, the decree creditor
was paid a small amount of cash but did give the debtor a full
satisfaction of the judgment mentioned in the decree. This satis-
faction piece was not filed of record until some time later. Upon
the filing thereof, the creditor brother then filed a petition alleging
that he received the cash as no more than a partial satisfaction
of the judgment; that this was insufficient consideration for the
satisfaction; and that the decree should be reinstated except as to
the amount so paid. At first blush, the discrepancy in the amounts
concerned would seem to be so great as to deny the right to call
the small cash payment an accord and satisfaction for the greater
amount admittedly due. Nevertheless, both the trial and the
reviewing court denied the petition, probably because of an in-
ability to overlook the fact that the brothers had been in business
together for more than thirty years and had had a series of
controversies which had been disputed, litigated, settled, and some-
times revived. As no one could be expected to fully understand
all the underlying motives, inducements, and intangible considera-
tions involved in a family transaction, the court felt that it should
equitably decline to interfere.
In the only other general contract case worthy of brief men-
tion,2 that of Jackson v. First National Bank of Lake Forest,3
the plaintiff, a lessee of commercial property held in trust by the
bank for the benefit of a co-defendant, had fallen and been injured
by the breaking of a defective hand-rail on the steps leading to
the basement of the leased premises. The action was predicated
2 The opinion of the Appellate Court in the case of Jackson v. First Nat. Bank of
Lake Forest, 348 Il1. App. 69, 108 N. E. (2d) 36 (1952), was discussed in 32
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 75-6.
8415 Ill. 453, 114 N. E. (2d) 721 (1953), noted in 42 Il1. B. J. 241, affirming 348
Ill. App. 69, 108 N. E. (2d) 38 (1952).
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upon negligence but the defense relied on an exculpatory clause
in the lease intended to free the lessor from "all liability arising
from failure to repair . . . defects in railings; or for any act or
omission or negligence of the lessor." A judgment notwithstand-
ing a verdict for plaintiff was affirmed as no negligence on the
part of either defendant was said to have been shown. The
plenary character of the exculpatory clause, and the fact that the
lease covered commercial property, must have been important
items of consideration for the existence of a rusted and defective
hand-rail would seem to impute negligence to some one. It is
important to note, therefore, that a public policy which has often
been invoked against contractual limitations on liability for com-
mon-law negligence was there held to be inapplicable.
4
Doctrines having bearing on the law relating to specialized
types of contracts, or quasi-contractual obligations, are discussed
separately hereafter under appropriate classifications.
BILLS AND NOTES
Two cases in this category may be said to have added some-
thing to the law relating to bills and notes although neither pro-
duced vital changes. In one of them, that of Barrett v. Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Company,5 an Illinois court was
called upon to construe, for the first time, the word "forgery" as
that term is used in the statute relating to liability for forged and
raised checks." Against the contention that the term covered only
the making of a false instrument and excluded the false making
of an instrument, the court concluded that the definition should
be co-extensive with that provided in the Criminal Code7 and the
4 Public policy aspects may be noted In two other cases. The case of Dwyer v.
Treacy, 118 F. Supp. 289 (1954), involving a corporation employment contract, is
discussed above. See Section I, Business Organizations, note 8. The case of
Friedman v. Agudath Achim North Shore Congregation, 351 I1. App. 413, 115 N.
E. (2d) 553 (1953), dealing with the validity of provisions against disinterment
in a contract for a burial lot, Is discussed hereafter. See Section III, Civil Practice
and Procedure, note 49, first series.
5 2 111. App. (2d) 70, 118 N. E. (2d) 631 (1954).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 16%, § 24.
7 Ibid., Ch. 38, 1 277.
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cases decided thereunder." In the light thereof, the word "for-
gery" would comprehend both situations, so the court held that
the bank in question enjoyed a protection under the statute in a
case where the instrument was drawn by a person without
authority even though such person had signed his own name.
In the other case, that of Ellithorpe v. Pioneer Trust & Sav-
ings Bank,9 the question was raised as to whether title had passed
where a negotiable instrument, payable to order, was delivered
without endorsement. Heretofore, it has been recognized that
title may pass in such a case either by way of gift 10 or under
Section 4D of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act," provided
that, in the last-mentioned instance, the transfer is made for
value. In the case in question, the transfer had been made pur-
suant to an order of the United States District Court entered in
connection with an action which was later dismissed with prejudice
to the rights of the plaintiff therein, said plaintiff being the one
whose title was here placed in issue. Manifestly, no gift was in-
tended, and there does not appear to have been any value given.
Nevertheless, the court, in an unsatisfactory opinion, held that
title had passed since the delivery was said to have been made
with the intent to transfer title. The facts in the case did not
appear to comply with either of the recognized channels for trans-
ferring title to unendorsed order instruments, although the court
made reference to both, so the case would seem to suggest that
a third mode for transferring title may have been developed. In
any event, further clarification in this area would appear to be
necessary as the intent with which delivery has been made has,
heretofore, been considered relevant only in cases involving pur-
ported gifts.
8 People v. Mau, 377 Ill. 199, 36 N. E. (2d) 235 (1941) ; People v. Kubanek, 370
Ill. 646, 19 N. E. (2d) 573 (1939).
9 2 Ill. App. (2d) 253, 119 N. E. (2d) 393 (1954). Leave to appeal has been denied.
10 See, for example, Collins v. Ogden, 323 I11. 594, 154 N. E. 701 (1926), and
Rothwell v. Taylor, 303 Ill. 226, 135 N. E. 419 (1922).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 69.
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INSURANCE
Certain important words of the Insurance Code relating to
the effect to be given to misrepresentations in life insurance policy
applications 12 came before the Appellate Court for the Second
District in the case of Asselborn v. State Farm Life Insuramce
Company,'3 a suit in which the beneficiary recovered. The insured
in question had died soon after the issuance of a policy. The policy
application asked the usual questions as to health and satisfactory
answers had been given. On a trial without a jury, the court
found that the insured had made inaccurate answers but could
find no evidence of intent to deceive. On the basis of this finding,
plus the fact that the insurer's knowledge of the actual situation
was at least as great as that of the insured, it was said that the
claim of the beneficiary had to prevail. The case, while not exactly
startling, does reflect a degree of liberal interpretation in favor
of the insured.
A sharp contrast to the holding in the last-mentioned case
would appear to be provided by the decision of the federal Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case of Matusek Academy
of Music v. National Surety Corporation,14 an action by an insured
to recover under the terms of a burglary insurance policy. The
contract contained a provision to the effect that loss would be
covered only if the burglar alarm system on the premises was in
working order at the time. An officer of the plaintiff admitted
that the alarm system was not working at the time of the burglary
but endeavored to justify the condition by referring to the fact
that the plaintiff had a contract for the maintenance thereof with
a third party. The court, upholding a denial of recovery, re-
sponded by saying that the policy measured the rights of the
parties and the exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous so the
contract was susceptible of but one interpretation.
12 Ibid., Vol. 1, Oh. 73, § 766.
13 1 Ill. App. (2d) 104, 116 N. E. (2d) 902 (1954), noted In 1954 Ill. L. Forum
131. Leave to appeal has been denied.
14 210 F. (2d) 333 (1954).
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The same court was asked, in the case of Hawkeye Security
Insurance Company v. Myers,i5 to consider a novel argument
offered on behalf of a respondent to a declaratory judgment
proceeding instituted by an automobile liability insurance carrier
in which a declaratory judgment was sought to the effect that the
carrier was not liable, under a policy it had issued to one Myers,
for damages suffered by a victim of Myers' careless driving. The
policy had been issued to cover a Pontiac car. Myers had traded
this automobile for a Hudson and then sought an endorsement on
the policy to cover the operation of the Hudson without informing
the carrier of the fact of the accident, which happened after the
trade but before the request for endorsement. The endorsement
had been given at a time when the carrier was still ignorant of the
fact that an accident had occurred. Additional factors justifying
non-coverage at the time of the accident, such as failure to give
proper notice and failure to co-operate, were also relied on. It
was at this juncture that the respondent then brought forth his
novel argument to the effect that, under the Illinois Safety
Responsibility Law, 16 the liability of a carrier becomes absolute
upon the occurrence of an accident causing injury to a third
person, regardless of breaches by the insured of conditions relat-
ing to notice and co-operation. This argument had been sustained
in a New Hampshire case based upon a statute of that state,'
7
but the court held that since, under the Illinois law, no policy had
been filed with and accepted by the Secretary of State as proof
of financial responsibility the provisions of the Illinois statute
were inapplicable.
While on the subject of automobile liability insurance, men-
tion might also be made of the holding of the Appellate Court for
the Fourth District in the case of Piper v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company.'8 The insured there endeavored
15210 F. (2d) 890 (1954).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 58b et seq.
17 See Farm Bureau Automobile Ins. Co. v. Martin, 97 N. H. 196, 84 A. (2d)
823, 29 A. L. R. (2d) 811 (1951).
18 1 11. App. (2d) 1, 116 N. E. (2d) 86 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAO0-KRNT LAW
REviEw 264.
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to secure reimbursement from the insurer for amounts paid out
in effecting voluntarily settlements with persons who had been
injured in a collision with the insured automobile. The policy
provided that no action should lie against the company unless
the insured's obligation to pay had been determined by judgment
or by written agreement to which the company was a party.
Although the plaintiff had judgment in the trial court, the judg-
ment was reversed upon appeal. The decision, although novel,
could hardly have been otherwise.
SALES
The ability of one lacking title to transfer ownership of per-
sonal property to a third person by sale or the like became the
subject of discussion in the case of Mori v. Chicago National
Bank.19 In that case, an owner of a car, desiring to sell the same,
left it with a used car dealer under an arrangement whereby the
dealer was authorized to procure bids in return for a commission
in the event a bid so procured was accepted and a sale completed.
This dealer gave the defendant bank, with whom he had maintained
prior business relationships, a bill of sale for the car as well as
a trust receipt and a promissory note for money then borrowed.
After the dealer had absconded and the defendant had taken pos-
session of the car, the owner filed an action as in trover, claiming
a conversion of his property. The bank defended that the owner
was estopped to assert his ownership. Accepting it to be a well-
established principle that an owner would be precluded from
asserting his ownership only if he had entrusted possession of an
article to an agent together with an express or implied authority
to sell the chattel or had clothed the agent with other indicia of
ownership, the court decided the owner could recover unless an
estoppel could be established. On this point, it declared that
the conduct of the one claiming the benefit of an estoppel would
be as important as the conduct of the owner. Since the defendant
bank had been negligent in failing to demand production of the
certificate of title to the car at the time of the loan, the claim of
19 3 11. App. (2d) 49, 120 N. E. (2d) 567 (1954).
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estoppel was defeated. Although the validity of a sale would not
be dependent upon the surrender of a title certificate, 20 the failure
on the part of an automobile purchaser to demand and to get such
a certificate could have important consequences.
The decision of the Appellate Court for the Fourth District in
the case of Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation2' is note-
worthy for, in that case, the particular court seems to have taken
a more reasonable attitude toward actions directed against manu-
facturers, based upon alleged breaches of implied warranties of
fitness in relation to food products in sealed containers, offered for
human consumption, than had been evidenced in the earlier case
of Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottling Company.22 Seem-
ingly relaxing the great burden of proof which it had previously
settled upon the plaintiff-consumer, the court denounced the grant-
ing of a directed verdict for the defendant-manufacturer in an
instance where the trial court had reasoned that a possibility of
tampering with the container and the food contents was present.
The Appellate Court declared that where such a possibility could
not normally and reasonably be expected, or was not probable upon
the basis of the evidence adduced, it would be improper to direct
a verdict and the issue should be left to the jury. On the other
hand, the Appellate Court for the First District, in Shaw v. Swift
& Company,23 decided that a trial court should 'have granted a
directed verdict for the defendant-manufacturer in a case involv-
ing the alleged unwholesomeness of food where the matter of a
possible contamination of the food product while still in the hands
of the manufacturer was based upon inferences drawn from mere
speculation and conjecture.
Another warranty question was projected in the case of Dixon
v. Montgomery Ward & Company Inc.,24 wherein the printed
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 76, dealing with certificates of title,
merely forbids the operation within the state of unregistered vehicles. It is not a
true "evidence of ownership" statute.
211 Ill. App. (2d) 28, 116 N. E. (2d) 193 (1953).
22343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N. E. (2d) 164 (1951).
23351 Ill. App. 135, 114 N. E. (2d) 330 (1953).
24351 Ill. App. 75, 114 N. E. (2d) 44 (1953).
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portion of a contract furnished by the seller covering the sale of a
furnace provided that the seller would not be liable for any dam-
age caused by a defective installation of the furnace and that the
installers were the purchaser's agents. The court refuted the
seller's argument of non-liability for faulty installation by re-
ferring to a typed portion of the contract which contained the
statement "install in workmanlike manner,' '25 stating that, in
such an instance, the typed portion would prevail over the printed
part. It also appeared therein that the purchaser had had nothing
to do with the installation and the installers were hired and paid
by the seller.
QUASI-CONTRACTS
Contractual obligations arising by operation of law, rather
than by act of the parties, have generally been enforced under the
description of quasi-contracts on the theory that it would be un-
just to allow one to receive and to retain benefits without making
some form of restitution. It would, however, be ridiculous to urge
that an implied contract should be found to exist in an area where
the law, by specific flat, forbids the making of an express contract
or where it requires compliance with certain conditions precedent
to the formation of a binding obligation. For these reasons, in
Greene v. City of DanviUe,26 the Appellate Court for the Third
District affirmed the action of a trial court in dismissing a suit
against a municipality, as in general assumpsit, *hen it appeared
that the plaintiff, owner of land which had been used by the muni-
cipality as a parking lot under an oral agreement between plaintiff
and the mayor, had failed to observe the customary amenities with
respect to the making of municipal contracts. 27 Holding that the
city could not be estopped from denying liability in the face of an
express statutory mandate declaring its ineffective contracts to
be null and void for all purposes, 28 the court reached the result
25 See 351 Ii. App. 75 at 89, 114 N. E. (2d) 44 at 47.
26 350 I11. App. 440, 113 N. E. (2d) 348 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 15- 3.
28 Ibid., § 15 - 3, states: "Any contract made . . . in violation of the provisions
of this section shall be null and void . . . and no money . . . shall be paid on
account thereof."
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that no quasi-contractual liability arose despite the admitted re-
ceipt by the municipality of benefits in the form of the use it had
made of the plaintiff's property.
2 9
The converse rule would seem to be the one to be applied,
however, where legally imposed conditions precedent to the mak-
ing of enforcible contracts, as in the statute of frauds situations,
have been enacted for the protection of private persons. One who
has received benefits and then relies on the statute of frauds as
a reason for not performing his oral promise may be compelled
to make suitable restitution. 30 If, by contrast, he has furnished
benefits but later repudiates the oral agreement, although the other
is willing and able to perform, he may not, according to the case
of Turner v. Katz,31 utilize a quasi-contractual remedy for the
recovery of that which he has given for then the tendency would
be to use the statutory protection as a sword rather than a shield.
The plaintiff there, who had made a cash down payment as lessee
under an oral agreement for the making of a long-term lease,
32
lost in his effort to secure the return of his deposit when it ap-
peared that the lessor-defendant was willing to enter into a bind-
ing written lease.33
Illustration of the length to which the law might go in formu-
lating quasi-contractual obligations, particularly when the moral
aspects of the situation possess a strong appeal, may be found in
the case of Shaver v. Brierton.34  One child who had expended
29 Compare this case, however, with the holding In the case of DeLeuw, Cather
& Co. v. City of Joliet, 327 Ill. App. 453, 64 N. E. (2d) 779 (1946), where compensa-
tion on a quasi-contractual basis for the benefit received was ordered paid from the
proceeds of a federal loan rather than from general funds of the municipality.
The requirement for the making of a prior appropriation was there deemed to be
inapplicable.
30 Nelson v. Fricke, 335 Ill. App. 273, 81 N. E. (2d) 763 (1948).
311 Ill. App. (2d) 245, 117 N. E. (2d) 406 (1954).
S2 The lease, by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 2, should have been in
writing.
33 The case was complicated by a dispute as to whether or not the cash paid was
to cover rent under an oral short-term lease, to be followed by a written lease for
a longer term, or was to be applied toward the rent due on the latter. If the
former, plaintiff got all he had bargained for, hence was not entitled to restitu-
tion. If the latter, he was at fault for refusal to execute the long-term lease when
the writing was tendered to him for signature. In that case, plaintiff would be
acting in an inequitable fashion, hence not entitled to equitable assistance.
341 Ill. App. (2d) 192, 117 N. E. (2d) 298 (1954), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT
LAw REvIEw 334.
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money in the support of an indigent parent was there permitted
to secure contribution from another child, after appropriate notice
and demand, on the theory the plaintiff had been forced to dis-
charge the defendant's obligation for him, hence was entitled to
reimbursement at least as to a proportionate part of the expense
so incurred. In order to find that the defendant was under an obli-
gation to support, the Appellate Court for the Second District
seized upon language in an Illinois statute creating a reciprocal
obligation between parents and children to provide for the support
of each other.8 5 Laudable as the holding might be, for certainly
no one child should be burdened with the obligation of support
while others go free, it is doubtful if the statute possesses the effect
purportedly given to it for it merely directs that an action to com-
pel support shall be instituted by certain designated public officials
and says nothing about inter-family responsibilities.
One other case might be mentioned, that of Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railway Company v. United States, 6 not so much
for its novelty as for the fact that it provides emphasis on the
point that, while contribution between joint tort-feasors is not
generally permitted in Illinois, 37 one who has been forced to honor
a secondary liability, as to an injured employee, may secure quasi-
contractual reimbursement for amounts so paid out from the per-
son primarily responsible for the harm. The fact that the plaintiff
and the defendant were each only vicariously liable, and that the
defendant was the sovereign government, was said to be of no
significance in placing the ultimate burden where it rightly be-
longed. This rather liberal treatment given to the subject matter
merely serves to add emphasis to the proposition that the whole
of the legal doctrine which relates to indemnification and contribu-
tion is sadly in need of a complete and thorough re-examination.
35 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 439- 2.
36 122 F. Supp. 368 (1954).
37 A general discussion of the Illinois law with respect to contribution appears
in a comment in 32 CHICAoO-KENT LAW REVIEW 298. Several workmen's compensa-
tion subrogation and indemnification cases are discussed above. See Section 1,
Business Organizations, notes 48 to 55.
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III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAIIABILITY OF REMEDIES
Little of consequence has arisen during the course of the year
regarding the jurisdiction to be exercised by the various courts
which comprise the judicial department of the State of Illinois. It
might be noted, however, as in the case of People ex re-l. Hoizapple
v. Ragen,' that the Illinois Supreme Court, despite an apparent
constitutional mandate to the contrary, 2 still refuses to take orig-
inal jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings in the event a
factual, rather than a legal issue, is presented by the record.8 Any
ambiguity as to the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Chi-
cago which may have been engendered by a seeming conflict be-
tween the statutory descriptions relating to first and fourth class
cases 4 was resolved, in the case of Secco v. Chicago Transit Au-
thority,8 in favor of the idea that the court in question may enter-
tain personal injury cases where the amount involved does not
exceed $5,000, although the maximum jurisdictional limit as to
other types of fourth class cases remains at $1,000.
For that matter, venue problems were also rare but, in the
case of Iowa-Illinois Gas c& Electric Company v. Perrine,6 a ques-
tion was raised as to whether or not a public utility which owned
property and did business in Rock Island County might sue there
to enjoin the Illinois Commerce Commission from interfering
with, or suspending the operation of, a proposed rate schedule
which had been filed in the office of the commission in Sangamon
County and on which schedule some action had been taken by the
12 Ill. (2d) 124, 117 N. E. (2d) 390 (1954), cert. den.- U. S.-, 74 S. Ct. 713,
98 L. Ed. (adv.) 581 (1954).
2 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1, states that the Supreme Court "shall have original
jurisdiction in cases relating to . .. habeas corpus."
3 The court relied on the decision in People ex rel. Jones v. Robinson, 409 Ill. 553,
101 N. E. (2d) 100 (1951), which was criticized in 30 CICAGO-KENT LAW REview
282.
4 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357, with the provision, as
amended by Laws 1951, p. 1726, which now appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1,
Ch. 37, § 357.
5 2 Ill. App. (2d) 239, 119 N. E. (2d) 471 (1954), noted in 32 CMICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEw 338.
6351 Ill. App. 195, 114 N. E. (2d) 572 (1953). Appeal has been dismissed.
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body in Cook County. Challenging jurisdiction under a special
appearance, the commission urged that the suit belonged in either
Sangamon or Cook County, since none of the defendant commis-
sioners resided in Rock Island County, on the theory the "trans-
actions" out of which the action arose, i.e. the filing of the rate
schedule, occurred in the first of these counties or else that "some
part thereof," i.e. the suspension order, had been entered in the
second of them. Analogy was made to the statutory provision
with respect to venue in injunction proceedings designed to stay
actions at law.7  The Appellate Court for the Second District,
nevertheless, following comparable holdings in other jurisdictions
in like cases,' sustained venue in Rock Island County by placing
the basis of the suit one stage farther back. It rested the decision
on the idea that the controlling "transaction," out of which the
dispute arose,9 was one related to the ownership and use of the
utility property as well as its threatened confiscation, the situs
of which clearly lay in the county where the suit had been
instituted.
Acquisition of jurisdiction over the parties is about as impor-
tant to litigation as is the presence of a court empowered to hear
and determine the controversy. Significant in this regard is the
holding achieved in two cases dealing with substituted methods for
service of process in suits arising out of the operation of auto-
mobiles on the highways of the state. 10 In the first case, that of
Ogdon v. Gianakos," retroactive effect was given to the 1949
amendment to the statute in question so as to make the same ap-
plicable to a resident who had been involved in a highway collision
prior to the passage of the amendment but who had, before suit
and service, departed from the state. The opinion of the Supreme
Court therein would indicate a shift from the agency theory, once
7 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 133(3).
8 See Smith v. Williams, 160 Fla. 580, 35 So. (2d) 844 (1948), and Montana-
Dakota Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission, 111 Mont. 78, 107 P. (2d) 533
(1940).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 131.
10 Ibid., Ch. 951/2, § 23.
11415 Ii. 591, 114 N. E. (2d) 686 (1953), reversing 348 Ill. App. 576, 109 N. E.
(2d) 628 (1952), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvrEw 261, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1087.
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used to support statutes of the kind in question against consti-
tutional attacks, to a "power" theory stemming from the state's
right to control acts occurring within its borders. The other case,
one entitled Dart Transit Company, Inc., v. Wiggins,12 held that
service under the statute was not confined to actions ex delicto but
might be utilized in suits designed to procure reimbursement, as by
way of general assumpsit, for money paid out in connection with
-highway accidents, and was available for use by non-resident as
well as resident plaintiffs. 18
The sufficiency of the summons, or the service thereof, was
challenged in two cases. In Wessel v. Eilenberger,14 the complaint
described the several defendants both as individuals and as oc-
cupying varied representative capacities but the summons named
these several defendants as individuals only. These defendants,
as individuals, responded to the merits of the case but lost and
then urged that the decree was invalid for lack of jurisdiction over
them in their several representative capacities. The court appears
to have achieved a common-sense result in holding the summons
and service to be sufficient under the circumstances, but does ap-
pear to have done some violence to procedural law by passing over,
without comment, the fact that the defendants had filed answers in
abatement with regard to the jurisdictional points involved. 1'5
In the other case, that of Tomaszewski v. George,16 a default judg-
ment was set aside, after term time,17 when it was made to appear
that the alleged service took the form of delivering a copy of the
121 Il1. Anp. (2d) 126, 117 N. E. (2d) 314 (1954), noted in 42 Ill. B. J. 656 and
1954 Iln. L. Forum 351.
13 Language in the case of Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309 at 313, 20 N. E. (2d) 592
at 594 (1939), to the effect that the lezislative intent was one designed to "secure
compensation for injuries to local residents," was declared to be too restricted in
character.
142 Iii. (2d) 522, 119 N. E. (2d) 207 (1954'), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT I&W
REVIEW 341.
15 See note In 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 341, particularly pp. 342-3, and
note 10 thereof.
16 1 Ill. App. (2d) 22, 116 N. E. (2d) 88 (1953).
17 Use of a petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, based upon fli.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196, was held to be a proper way to raise the
question.
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summons to the defendant's wife in defendant's absence 8 but,
despite a statement to the contrary in the return, it was not clearly
shown that a copy of the summons was thereafter mailed to the
defendant as is the requirement of the statute.19 Since the action
was one of in personam character, rigid and full compliance with
the statute was declared to be essential.
20
Jurisdiction may, of course, be acquired by the defendant's
voluntary submission, as by general appearance, in which case
jurisdictional defects may be overlooked. The case of Liberty
National Bank of Chicago v. Vance2' might be considered im-
portant in that respect for in that action a judgment had been
taken, by confession, against a lessee and an assignee of the lessee.
The assignee moved to vacate the judgment on the basis that she
had both defenses and counterclaims to the suit for rent but the
trial court denied relief with regard thereto. On appeal, she
urged for the first time that jurisdiction over her had not been
obtained since, by the assignment, she had agreed to assume no
more than liability for the rent due or to become due and had not
become a party to the warrant of attorney to confess tjudgment
for lack of suitable language to that effect. The reviewing court
agreed with this contention and found the original judgment by
confession to be void but then proceeded to point out that the
assignee's participation in the merits of the case had constituted
a general appearance in the cause so it was only necessary to
vacate the original judgment and thereafter return the case for
entry of a new and valid judgment.
Some new points have been made with reference to the opera-
18 The deputy sheriff testified that he delivered the summons to the defendant's
wife whiie she was talking to two or three other women "on the sidewalk about
ten or fifteen feet away from her residence." Query, is this the same as leaving
the summons at defendant's place of abode?
19 fl1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 137, specifies the conditions imposed by
law on substitute service.
20 Mention might be made of the fact that, in Welch v. Downs, 1 Ill. App. (2d)
424, 118 N. E. (2d) 51 (1954), it was held that service by publication in an Ohio
proceeding to revive an earlier Ohio judgment was inadequate to bind an Illinois
resident, even though he had personally participated in the original proceeding,
inasmuch as the revivor proceeding was one of in personam character and personal
service of process in Ohio would have been needed to make the revived judgment
valid and enforcible in this state.
213 Ill. App. (2d) 1, 120 N. E. (2d) 349 (1954).
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tion of applicable statutes of limitation and the effect they may
possess on the time within which to bring suit. By its holding in
the case of Orlicki v. McCarthy,22 the Appellate Court for the
First District has aligned itself with the views expressed by the
Appellate Court for the Fourth District,23 on the question as to
whether or not the 1949 amendment to the Dram Shop Act,24 which
prescribes a two-year limitation on dram shop actions, possesses
retroactive effect. The issue is one which will eventually be re-
solved by the mere passage of time, for the Supreme Court does
not appear to have done anything to resolve the matter. The hold-
ing of the Appellate Court for the Second District in the case of
Geneva Construction Company v. Martin Transfer & Storage
Company,25 a case dealing with the right of a court to permit the
addition of new parties to assert additional claims in a pending
suit after the period for bringing an original suit has expired, does
appear to be destined for further examination. The court there,
in a proceeding by an employer for reimbursement of funds ex-
pended for compensation benefits paid its injured employee, al-
lowed the employee, more than two years after the injury,26 to
intervene in the pending action against the party at fault for the
purpose of participating in the recovery as well as in asserting
new claims against the defendant.2 7  The holding of the Illinois
Supreme Court in the case of Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn,2s dealing
22 2 Il. App. (2d) 182, 119 N. E. (2d) 1 (1954), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 346.
23 See Fourt v. DeLazzer, 348 11. App. 191, 108 N. E. (2d) 599 (1952), noted in
31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RFWJIw 273.
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135, as amended by Laws 1949, p. 816.
25 351 Ill. App. 289, 114 N. E. (2d) 906 (1953). Leave to appeal has been granted.
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 15, directs that actions for damages for
injuries to the person shall be commenced within two years next after the cause
of action accrues.
27 The employee's failure to take more prompt action may have rested on the
fact that the decision in Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E.
(2d) 124 (1952), declaring a portion of the Workmen's Compensation Act which
forbade suit by a covered employee to be unconstitutional, was not achieved until
some time after the employer had begun Its suit. Following that decision, the
employee appears to have sought, by intervention and amendment, to assert his
common-law action against the third-person defendant and the employer's action
was amended to seek reimbursement.
28 371 I. 203, 20 N. E. (2d) 280 (1939). See also a note entitled "Bringing in
New Parties: Effect of Statute of Limitations," in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW RnviEw
170.
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with the converse of the problem as it relates to the right to add
new parties defendant to a pending action after the limitation
period has expired, would seem to militate against the decision in
question.
Differences between varying periods of limitation with respect
to suits on written and oral contracts29 as well as differences in
the nature of the defendant's possession of land as tenant under
a written lease and a holdover tenancy provoked an interesting
limitation problem in the case of Eilers v. Eilers.30 The defendant
there concerned had taken possession of farm lands under a one-
year written lease calling for both a cash and a share-crop rental,
with express provision for renewal at the same terms "by en-
dorsement thereon." At the end of the term, the tenant remained
in possession, without any endorsement having been made on the
written lease, and so continued until suit was brought, some seven
years later, for an accounting. To this suit, the defendant inter-
posed a number of defenses but particularly urged that recovery
was barred on the entire claim for failure to bring suit within
five years. On appeal from a decree ordering an accounting, the
Appellate Court for the Third District held that, as the written
lease had not been effectively renewed, the ten-year statute applied
to rent falling due in the first year of possession whereas the
five-year statute applied to the periodic terms created by implica-
tion from the holding over, to be measured from the end of each
such period3 ' rather than, as the defendant had urged, being made
applicable from the inception of the first of the periodic tenancies.
Inasmuch as the right to secure trial by jury in an appro-
priate case has bearing on the availability of remedies and is a
matter usually given attention at the outset,32 it would appropriate
to note here that, in the case of Reese v. Laymon,33 the Supreme
29 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16, with ibid., § 17.
30350 Ill. App. 453, 113 N. E. (2d) 191 (1953).
31 According to Dixon v. Niccols, 39 Il1. 372 (1866), rent is not due, particularly
if payable in crops, until the end of the term In the absence of agreement or proof
of custom to the contrary.
32 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188, as to the time for making the
demand for jury trial.
332 Ill. (2d) 614, 119 N. E. (2d) 271 (1954), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvEw 345.
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Court indicated that a complete reversal had occurred in the
former practice under which it had been possible, following ap-
pellate review, to make a belated demand for jury trial in the
event the cause was remanded for new trial.8 4  The court there
held that, without regard to any further steps which might be
taken in the case, if jury trial was not demanded at the outset the
privilege thereof would be forever and totally waived.
Issues concerning the proper parties to litigation came be-
fore the courts in several instances. In only one case, that of
Strader v. Board of Education,"5 could it be said that anything
was discussed with respect to parties plaintiff and then only as
to those who seek to intervene in pending litigation.86 The court
there did, however, draw some important distinctions between in-
tervenors who wish to participate on the side of the plaintiff
87
and those who, after intervention, might be more nearly regarded
as defendants. If acting in the latter capacity, and to the end
that a "complete determination of the controversy" 3 might be
procured, the court said that intervenor-defendants should be per-
mitted to set up new claims and bring in new parties, provided so
doing would not unduly interfere with or delay the original pro-
ceeding, especially if to do otherwise would be likely to engender
a multiplicity of actions.
Insofar as parties defendant were concerned, the case of
Ylonen v. Ylonen,3 9 reiterates the proposition that all beneficiaries
under a land trust would be necessary parties to a suit to partition
the trust res but the court there did note that, as between bene-
ficiaries over whom the court had jurisdiction, the action might
proceed to the solution of their rights even though other bene-
34 See, for example, Osgood v. Skinner, 186 Il. 491, 57 N. E. 1041 (1900).
35 351 Ill. App. 438, 115 N. E. (2d) 539 (1953), cause transferred 413 Ill. 610,
110 N. E. (2d) 191 (1953).
38 Some aspects of the problem with particular emphasis in workmen's compensa-
tion proceedings have been previously noted. See Section I, Business Organiza-
tions, notes 48 to 55.
37 They would, generally, under the rule of Hairgrove v. City of Jacksonville,
366 Ill. 163, 8 N. E. (2d) 187 (1937), be obliged to accept the case as they find it
at the moment intervention is permitted.
as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 149.
39 2 Ill. (2d) 111, 117 N. E. (2d) 98 (1954).
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ficiaries, being non-resident, had not been brought under the con-
trol of the court, hence could not be regarded as bound by the de-
cree. An excellent illustration of the beneficial purpose underly-
ing Section 24(1) of the Civil Practice Act,40 which provides for
joinder of defendants in the alternative, may be found in the case
of American Transportation Company, Inc. v. U. S. Sanitary
Specialties Corporation,4 1 wherein a lessee combined claims against
its sub-tenant, its landlord, and certain strangers on the theory
that one or the other was responsible for the loss sustained. The
count against the sub-tenant rested on an alleged breach of con-
tract; the one against the lessor charged a constructive eviction;
and the one against the strangers was based on a tortious trespass
to the premises. A motion to strike the complaint for an alleged
misjoinder of claims and parties, under which it had been urged
that there was no common ground in the several claims to warrant
the inclusion of all of them in one suit, had been sustained in the
trial court but the Appellate Court for the First District reversed
on the theory the plaintiff had the right, in view of the alternative
character of the several claims, to have the question of ultimate
liability on the part of the respective defendants decided in the
one case.
By far the most outstanding development in procedural law,
although technically one not falling within the limits of this sur-
vey, has been produced as the result of the final outcome of the
case of Johnson v. Moon ,4 2 a case concerning the right to use a
species of third-party practice in a law action so as to permit the
bringing in of new parties under a counterclaim filed by the
original defendant. The Appellate Court for the First District
had there determined that, except as the Civil Practice Act had
preserved older ideas with regard to the introduction of new
parties under a counterclaim based upon a former cross-bill in
equity,4 there was nothing in the present statute to support the
40 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 148(1).
412 Il1. App. (2d) 144, 118 N. E. (2d) 793 (1954).
423 I1. (2d) 561, 121 N. E. (2d) 774 (1954), reversing 1 I1. App. (2d) 6, 116
N. M. (2d) 95 (1953).
43 See Curran v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 348 Ill. App. 210, 108 N. E. (2d)
729 (1952).
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development of a system of third-party practice, so it sustained
the dismissal of the counterclaim as to those who were not parties
to the original action. 4 The Supreme Court, however, on leave to
appeal, reversed these holdings and reinstated the counterclaim in
the apparent belief that, at least to some degree, third-party prac-
tice was authorized by Section 25 of the Civil Practice Act 45 in
order to bring about that "complete determination of the contro-
versy" which, if separate suits had been filed, could have been
accomplished under a proper consolidation of the separate cases
for trial at one and the same time.4 6 The startling interpretation
so given appears to contradict the belief which has been held
until now that there is need for specific provisions authorizing
the use of, as well as regulating, third-party practice.
4 7
Nothing has been done to change the established course of the
law with regard to the nature of legal remedies but issues with
regard to the scope of equitable and statutory remedies do still
arise. In that connection, although it is a well-established prin-
ciple that equity will exercise jurisdiction over the disinterment
of the bodies of deceased persons, two new cases dealing with
problems of that nature are of some interest. While both empha-
size the general rule that, in each disinterment case, the wishes of
those nearest to the deceased person by reason of relationship or
association, together with the wishes of the deceased, the interests
of the public, and the tenets of the religious organization in whose
cemetery the deceased is buried should be taken into consideration,
the decision in Fischer's Estate v. Fischer4s points out that the
body of the deceased person forms no part of the estate so that
a probate court would lack a general equity jurisdiction over the
subject of interment and disinterment of human bodies. In the
44 The right to use a counterclaim as between the original parties is clearly de-
fined in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 162.
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 149.
46 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 175.
47 Compare, for example, Fed. Civ. Pro. Rule 19(b), dealing with the addition
of parties who ought to be included if complete relief is to be accorded, with Fed.
Civ. Pro. Rule 14, regulating third party practice. A similar comparison may be
noted in Sections 193 and 193-A of the New York Civil Practice Act. See also 28
CmCAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 1 at p. 33.
481 Ill. App. (2d) 528, 117 N. E. (2d) 855 (1954).
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other case, that of Friedman v. Agudath Achim North Shore Con-
gregation,9 it appeared that the deceased person had purchased
a burial lot in a cemetery owned by a religious organization whose
tenets prohibited disinterment. The purchase contract and the
certificate issued thereunder referred to the rules of the religious
faith in question and provided that these rules should be observed.
The Appellate Court for the First District held that such a pur-
chase contract, prohibiting disinterment, was not contrary to
public policy and, being lawful, should be protected by a court
having general equitable jurisdiction in the event a disinterment
of the body of the deceased purchaser of the cemetery lot was
attempted. A desire on the part of the relatives of the lot owner
to place their departed one in a more beautiful and modern
cemetery was not there regarded as being of sufficient substance
to disturb the scene of last repose.
Cases involving attempts to compel specific performance of
oral agreements are seldom successful. In Weiss v. Beck,50
wherein the plaintiff sought to secure specific performance of a
verbal adoption contract, the Supreme Court reiterated the
principle that specific performance of such an oral contract should
not be granted unless the proof as to the existence and terms of
the contract was clear and convincing. The court rejected the
more flexible and to some extent more desirable rule prevalent in
some other jurisdictions which takes the position that a verbal
adoption agreement may be proven by facts and circumstances
sufficient to raise an implication that the contract was actually
made, which implication, in turn, may find corroboration in the
conduct of the parties.
Aspects of injunction practice were discussed in three cases.
In one of them, that of Callahan v. Holsman,51 the question arose
as to whether the verification of a complaint upon which a tem-
porary injunction had been granted was correctly worded. A
majority of the judges of the Appellate Court for the First Dis-
49 351 I1. App. 413, 115 N. E. (2d) 553 (1953).
501 Ill. (2d) 420, 115 N. E. (2d) 768 (1953).
51351 Ill. App. 1, 113N. E. (2d) 483 (1953), noted in 32 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
REvrFw 186. Robson, P. J., wrote a specially concurring opinion.
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trict rejected an argument based on the alleged insufficiency of
the language used on the ground that it would require the court
to indulge in primitive and outdated formalism. The concurring
judge, pointing to a long line of decisions, some of which had
been rendered by the Supreme Court, wherein a technical attitude
had been taken with regard to verifications of the type involved,
urged that an Appellate Court lacked authority to overrule or
disregard these contrary decisions. In the second case, that of
Kolin v. Leitch,52 where a temporary injunction had been wrong-
fully issued against the board of directors of a non-profit cor-
poration which operated a school, it was said that the fact that
the name of the school corporation had not been joined with the
names of the directors in the motion to dismiss the injunction
would not preclude the school, as the actual party damnified with-
in the meaning of Section 12 of the Injunction Act,53 from re-
covering damages for the wrongful issuance of the injunction.
The third case, that of Material Service Corporation v. Hollings-
worth,54 emphasizes the power equity courts possess to uphold
justice and good conscience for it was there said that an equity
court had an inherent power, for equitable reasons, to modify or
even revoke a permanent injunction, if that should be required to
meet changing conditions either of law or fact.
Statutory remedies with equitable aspects also received atten-
tion at the hands of the courts. The necessity for an "actual
controversy" to support use of a declaratory judgment proceed-
ing55 was noted in the case of Spalding v. Granite City56 with the
court there concluding that, as the plaintiff would not be affected
by the statute which he had claimed was unconstitutional, no
"controversy" existed between the parties, hence it was improper
for the plaintiff to seek declaratory relief. In Jones v. Hodges,
57
52351 Ill. App. 66, 113 N. E. (2d) 806 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAw
REvimw 187.
53 1ll. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 69, § 12.
54 415 Ill. 284, 112 N. E. (2d) 703 (1953).
55 nIl. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
56415 Ill. 274, 113 N. E. (2d) 567 (1953).
572 I1. App. (2d) 509, 119 N. E. (2d) 806 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
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however, the court approved the granting of affirmative relief to
a defendant in a declaratory judgment proceeding, thereby indi-
cating that actions of the kind in question may move beyond the
diplomatic level of a mere declaration of rights and may end up
being as effectively adversary and bitter in character as is true of
the older remedies. Mention might also be made of the fact that, in
Pierce v. Pierce,58 the statute with regard to suits for partition59
was construed so as to permit the use of such an action as between
lessees under a long-term lease. Feudal distinctions between real
estate and chattels were there discarded in favor of a more
modern approach to the subject.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS
Very little has been said concerning the content, the form, or
the manner of setting forth the claim in the complaint upon which
the civil action is based. While Section 43(2) of the Civil Prac-
tice Act60 specifically permits the use of a degree of alternative
pleading6 ' it should be noticed that this privilege is subject to
the qualification that the alternative method is to be used only
when the party is "in doubt as to which of two or more statements
of fact is true." It was, therefore, held to be error, in the case
of Church v. Adler, 2 for a plaintiff to allege, in one count of a
malpractice complaint, that she would be "sick, sore, lame and
disordered for the rest of her life" and, in a second alternative
count, to charge that, as the result of subsequent surgery made
necessary by the defendant's malpractice, she had "regained her
health," since it was clear that the plaintiff could not be "in
doubt" with respect thereto.63 The bar should also be advised,
58351 Ill. App. 336, 115 N. E. (2d) 107 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REviiw 265. Leave to appeal has been granted.
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 44.
60 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 167(2).
61 See above, this section, note 41, for a discussion of the case of American Trans-
portation Co., Inc., v. U. S. Sanitary Specialties Corp., 2 Ill. App. (2d) 144, 118
N. E. (2d) 793 (1954), which deals with alternative joinder of parties.
62.350 Il1. App. 471, 113 N. E. (2d) 327 (1953).
63 See, however, the novel approach followed in Lustig v. Hutchinson, 349 I1.
App. 120, 110 N. E. (2d) 278 (1953), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvrzw 275,
where a real doubt as to which of two defendants was liable did exist.
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from the holding in the case of Curran v. Harris Trust & Savings
Bank 64 that the principle which requires pleading, proof and
judgment to coincide and be mutually self-supporting, like a
three-legged stool, is still the law of this state. It was there held
to be error to make an award of attorney's fees, even though
the contract in question so provided, because, no mention of the
supporting facts had appeared in the complaint, 5 nor had the
point been mentioned in the prayer for relief.
Insofar as issues regarding the preparation of defensive
pleadings were concerned, the holding in the case of DeLude v.
Rimek,66 while changing the law as to trial procedure, does nothing
to settle the question as to whether or not a defendant in a tort
action is entitled to plead, by way of answer, the existence of a
covenant not to sue a co-tort-feasor in support of an effort to
procure a benefit from the amount paid for such covenant. As
efforts to inject the question by way of petition after verdict
have produced contrary results, 67 it would seem to be advisable
for the defendant to raise the issue by answer.
6 8
An answer containing a denial of execution of a written in-
strument, provided the denial is verified in accordance with
Section 35(2) of the Civil Practice Act,69 will serve to generate
an issue as to the genuineness of the instrument but, under the
rule of Niehaus v. Niehaus,70 the denial will not force the party
relying on the instrument to sustain the burden by common-law
proof of execution, as by attesting or transaction witnesses, if
64 2 Ill. App. (2d) 395, 119 N. E. (2d) 483 (1954).
65 The issue actually arose under a counterclaim but, for this purpose, the same
must be regarded as a complaint: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 162(3).
66 351 Ill. App. 466, 115 N. E. (2d) 561 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 268.
67 Compare New York C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. American Transit Lines, Inc., 339
Ill. App. 252, 89 N. E. (2d) 858 (1949), reversed for other reasons in 408 Ill. 336, 97
N. E. (2d) 264 (1951), with the cases of Hyde v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 343 Ill.
App. 512, 99 N. E. (2d) 382 (1951), and Smith v. Medendorp, 343 Ill. App. 512,
99 N. E. (2d) 571 (1951).
68 See also Burns v. Stouffer, 344 I1. App. 105, 100 N. E. (2d) 507 (1951), which
deals with the way by which an issue may be raised in the event a covenant not
to sue is procured by one of the defendants after trial has been begun.
69 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 159(2).
702 Ill. App. (2d) 434, 120 N. E. (2d) 66 (1954).
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAV-1953-1954
other proof can be aided by appropriate presumptions.' A clear
distinction does exist between a purely defensive answer and
new matter which may be contained therein but which is intended
to be not merely an affirmative defense but rather to possess
affirmative operation for, in the last-mentioned instance, a
counterclaim should then be utilized,' 2 following the line of
an old-fashioned cross-bill in equity.7 3  The case of Pliley
v. Phifer74 would indicate, nevertheless, that a decree grant-
ing affirmative relief to a defendant would be proper, even
though the answer failed to include a counterclaim, if the
plaintiff fails to make seasonable objection to the form of the
answer. The decision is, however, one which should be confined
to the particular facts for, if the decree had been reversed, the
court would have ended up holding a sum of money with no one
being entitled thereto.
75
Two cases dealing with the verification of original pleadings
7
possess enough significance to merit attention. In the case of
Callahan v. Holsman,77 the question was one as to the technical
sufficiency of an affidavit to a complaint for injunctive relief
which affidavit had been challenged on the ground that it was not
possible to determine therefrom which allegations in the com-
plaint were absolutely verified and which ones were only quali-
fiedly so treated, hence it would have been difficult, if not im-
possible, to base a prosecution for perjury thereon. The Appel-
late Court for the First District, speaking lightly as to the per-
jury aspect, found the verification sufficient. In Loraitis v.
71 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, §§ 31 and 36, as to pre-
sumptions which attend upon negotiable instruments.
72 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 162.
73 See Nietert v. Blank, 199 Ill. App. 28 (1916).
74 I Il. App. (2d) 398, 117 N. E. (2d) 678 (1954). See also Jones v. Hodges, 2
Ill. App. (2d) 509. 119 N. E. (2d) 806 (1954), for a similar holding as to the suf-
ficiency of an answer in a declaratory judgment proceeding to support affirmative
relief where no seasonable objection had been made.
75 The general rule on the point is illustrated by the case of Curran v. Harris
Trust & Savings Bank, 2 Ill. App. (2d) 395, 119 N. E. (2d) 483 (1954), discussed
above, this section. note 64.
76 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 159, deals with verification of pleadings.
77 351 Ill. App. 1. 113 N. E. (2d) 483 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
Rvimw ]6. Robson, P. J., wrote a specially concurring opinion.
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Kukulka,'7 however, the Supreme Court upheld a punishment
for contempt based upon a false verification of an answer even
though, by law, no verification was required because it was offered
to an unsworn complaint. A contention that constitutional rights
were invaded was answered by saying that the defendant had
voluntarily given up his privilege to remain silent by swearing
to his answer, hence had to swear truthfully.
Most of the pleading disputes grew out of efforts to amend
pleadings which, for one reason or another, had proved to be
inadequate. The proffered amendment to the complaint filed in
the case of Milewski v. Milewski,79 an amendment designed to
enlarge the scope of the action from a suit for separate mainte-
nance to one to impress a trust for the plaintiff's benefit in
certain assets belonging to the principal defendant who had died
after the suit had been instituted, was held properly rejected by
reason of the limited character of the initial suit s° plus the fact
that the principal proceeding had become moot. On the other
hand, in Ray v. Starr,8l it was decided that an amendment to a
complaint was necessary and should have been allowed, to permit
the plaintiff to set forth a written agreement as an exhibit or
to provide an explanation for a failure so to do,82 when, at the
time of the filing of the original complaint, the plaintiff appeared
not to have known of the existence of the writing.
After an amendment has been permitted, questions might
well arise as to whether or not the amended case would be open
to attack from the standpoint of a defense that the claim is
barred, particularly where the amendment comes after the limi-
tation period has expired. 3 A liberal construction was given,
78 1 Ill. (2d) 533, 116 N. E. (2d) 329 (1953), noted in 32 CHIAGO4-KENT LAW
REvimw 266.
79 351 Ill. App. 158, 114 N. E. (2d) 419 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
80 See the case of Petta v. Petta, 321 Ill. App. 512, 53 N. E. (2d) 324 (1944),
noted in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 281, with respect to the right of a court,
in a separate maintenance proceeding, to decide questions concerning the property
rights of the spouses.
81351 Ill. App. 344, 115 N. E. (2d) 112 (1953).
82 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 160.
83 See above, this section, note 25, for a discussion of the case of Geneva Coast.
Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 351 Ill. App. 289, 114 N. E. (2d) 906 (1953),
in which leave to appeal has been granted, where the issue was one as to the right
to add new parties by an amendment filed after the limitation period had expired.
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in the case of Rossler v. Liberty National Bank of Chicago, 4 so
as to permit the amendment to relate back, 5 and thereby avoid
a defense that the action was barred, for it was clear that the
amended cause grew out of the same occurrences as those de-
scribed in the original complaint."' The issue in the case of
First Securities Company of Chicago v. Schroeder87 was not quite
so apparent for the plaintiff, suing on a promissory note, had
made one amendment to assert its claim as assignee and then
filed another which changed the theory for recovery to an entirely
different one but was given judgment under the principle of rela-
tion back. The case does, however, serve to illustrate the pres-
ence of a degree of confusion on the part of the Appellate Court
for the First District since reliance was placed therein on provi-
sions of the Civil Practice Act whereas the case had been insti-
tuted in the Municipal Court of Chicago, hence should have been
governed by the procedural rules thereof.8
Assuming that a pleading amendment of some sort is neces-
sary, the decision in the case of Soverino v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Company 9 should serve as a warning that permission
to amend must be obtained before final judgment, except as Sec-
tion 46(1) of the Civil Practice Act may authorize a later amend-
ment to make the pleadings conform to the proof adduced at the
trial,90 so that, if the judgment has been entered as under a
decision on a motion to dismiss the suit, the party may not there-
after compel the court to vacate the judgment simply for the
purpose of entering an order granting permission to the party
84 351 Ill. App. 289, 118 N. E. (2d) 621 (1954). Leave to appeal has been denied.
85 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol 2, Ch. 110, § 170(2).
86 A tenant had there sued a landlord to recover for personal injuries caused
when a stairway in the demised premises collapsed. The original complaint
charged a negligent failure to repair whereas the amended complaint, filed to con-
form pleadings to proof, charged a negligent albeit gratuitous repairing on the
part of the landlord.
87 351 Ill. App. 173, 114 N. E. (2d) 426 (1953).
88 It should be noted that Rule 43 of the Municipal Court of Chicago is identical
with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 170 so reliance on the latter provision
did not constitute serious error. It is suggested, however, that courts and lawyers
should be alert to notice that differences do exist between procedural methods In
state courts and those followed in the Municipal Court of Chicago.
892 Ill. App. (2d) 357, 119 N. E. (2d) 494 (1954).
90 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 170 (1).
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for the filing of amended pleadings. Timely action, therefore, is
essential. In that connection, it might also be mentioned that the
case of Salitan v. Neff Feed Company9 supports the view that,
where the amendment is one to make the pleadings conform to
the proofs, hence one which might be made even after a judgment
has been rendered, the amendment must still be made in the trial
court and prior to appea 9 2 and may not be attempted before the
reviewing tribunal.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE
Antecedent to the trial itself, some questions may be gener-
ated regarding such things as summary judgment procedure, pre-
trial discovery and the like. On the first of these points, it may
be noted that, under Section 57 of the Civil Practice Act,93
summary judgment procedure is available only in those instances
enumerated in the statute and then only in relation to actions "at
law or in equity." It was, therefore, asserted in the case of
Barkhausen v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Com-
pany94 that a motion for summary judgment would be improper
in a declaratory judgment proceeding since the same was neither
a suit at law nor a proceeding in equity but one purely of statu-
tory cognizance.9 5 The Appellate Court for the First District,
however, reached the conclusion that the end sought to be achieved,
to-wit: to facilitate litigation and expedite trial procedure, was
as desirable in a declaratory judgment proceeding as in any other
type of action and, finding no express statutory prohibition to
the contrary, approved the use of a motion for summary judg-
ment in the case before it.
Pre-trial discovery and deposition practice was involved in
two rather important cases. One of them, that of Pink v. Demp-
91 351 Ill. App. 127. 114 N. E. (2d) 320 (1953).
92 See Bollaert v. Kankakee Tile & Brick Co., 317 Ill. App. 120, 45 N. E. (2d)
506 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 244.
93 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.
94 351 Ill. App. 388, 115 N. E. (2d) 640 (1953), reversed on other grounds in 3
Ill. (2d) 254, 120 N. E. (2d) 649 (1954).
95 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1, creates the right to secure declara-
tory relief.
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sey, 96 was caught up in last year's survey 97 as it was decided
within a few days after the survey period closed. It is worth
mentioning again9" that the court there held that the taking of a
pre-trial discovery deposition from an otherwise incompetent
claimant against a decedent's estate did not operate to waive the
witness' disqualification.9 9 In the other, that of Harch v. Illinois
Terminal Railroad Company,' the plaintiff began suit in a state
court to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained in an
accident covered under the federal Boiler Inspection Act.2 The
defendant moved for an order to compel plaintiff to submit to a
pre-trial physical examination in the manner directed by Rule 35
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but this motion was de-
nied. The Appellate Court for Fourth District held that no error
had occurred in this respect inasmuch as no state rule on the
subject was in existence nor had any such discovery been required
by any local precedent 3 and the federal rule on the point was
specifically made controlling only to suits begun in, or transferred
to, federal courts.4
In the realm of evidence law, at least as the same relates to
proof in civil cases, 5 no new decisions of any real significance
have been achieved6 but the case of DeLude v. Rimek 7 has im-
96 350 I1. App. 405, 113 N. E. (2d) 334 (1953), noted in 32 CHIcAoo-KKNT LAW
REVIEW 190. Leave to appeal has been denied.
97 See 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 38.
98 The case was noted later in 6 Stan. L. Rev. 358 and 40 Va. L. Rev. 71.
99 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2, states the familiar "dead man" rule
as to the qualification of adverse parties.
1351 Ill. App. 272, 114 N. E. (2d) 901 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
245 U. S. C. A. §23.
3 See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Benson, 352 Ill. 195, 185 N. E. 244 (1933).
4 See Fed. Rules of Civil Pro., Rule 1.
5 Matters of evidence peculiar to criminal cases are discussed in Section IV,
Criminal Law and Procedure, particularly notes 50 to 66 thereof, post.
6 Mention could be made of the case of People v. Dolgin, 415 Ill. 434, 114 N. E.
(2d) 389 (1953, noted in 1954 Ill. L. Forum 336, actually a criminal prosecution
based on an alleged violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453 et seq.,
for the effect it might have by way of implementing the "public document" excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. It was there held proper to admit into evidence a photo-
static copy of a letter from the Department of Revenue to the manufacturer of
certain tax meter stamping machines approving the design of the stamp as an
appropriate extension of the evidence rule.
7351 Ill. App. 466, 115 N. E. (2d) 561 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KEINT LAW
REVrEW 268, 1954 Ill. L. Forum 127, and 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 268.
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portant bearing on an issue of trial procedure in tort actions
where a covenant not to sue has been given one of the tort-feasors
and another tort-feasor desires to have the benefit, by way of
credit against the ultimate recovery, for the amount paid for
such covenant. It was there decided that proof regarding the
covenant was irrelevant, inadmissible, and likely to prejudice the
outcome of the case, hence should not be permitted to reach the
jury. Recognizing that the amount so paid should be deducted
from the ultimate recovery,8 the Appellate Court for the First
District said it was the function of the jury to find the total dam-
age sustained but that it was the function of the judge, upon
application made after verdict, to determine the amount by which
the verdict should be reduced. It was, therefore, held to be
prejudicial error to submit this issue to the jury.
Once trial has been begun, the plaintiff is, by Section 52 of the
Civil Practice Act,9 very properly limited in relation to his right
to dismiss the proceedings or to procure a voluntary nonsuit. It
was urged, in the case of Perry v. Waddelow,10 that this section
did not control in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding inas-
much as actions of that type were exempted from the operation
of the Civil Practice Act" but the court decided otherwise in the
light of a provision in the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act
12
which was designed to assimilate the practice in suits under that
statute with the general practice in state courts.' 8 The case of
Wilhite v. Agbayani14 is also important on the point for it was
there held that the principles which control a plaintiff who desires
to take a voluntary nonsuit are equally applicable to a defendant
8 See Aldridge v. Morris, 377 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949), noted In
27 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 313. See also 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 54.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 176.
10 351 Ill. App. 356, 115 N. E. (2d) 348 (1953).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 125.
12 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 11.
13 The specific provision in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 17, dealing with
dismissal of the suit as to one or more of the defendants and the plaintiff's right
to take judgment as to the others, was held not to be in par! materia with Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 176, regulating a complete voluntary nonsult.
142 Ill. App. (2d) 29, 118 N. E. (2d) 440 (1954), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT
LAw RlErEw 339. Leave to appeal has been denied.
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who desires to procure similar relief with regard to a counter-
claim. The court also there declared that a trial or hearing would
have been commenced, within the meaning of the applicable statute,
if not as soon as the jury had been called for examination then
certainly by the time the jury had been selected and sworn to try
the issues, even though no evidence had been introduced or testi-
mony taken.
The degree of control which the trial court may exercise with
respect to the trial and the ensuing judgment was also made the
subject of investigation. In that connection, the common-law con-
cept that a trial court judgment, whether against one or more
defendants, was a unit which had to stand as rendered or had to
be set aside in toto15 was reviewed in the case of Chmielewski v.
Marich with the result that older ideas on the subject were
forced to yield to more modern views. The case was one in which
several defendants had been joined in a dram shop proceeding
and a default judgment had been pronounced against all of them
for failure to offer a contest. The defendants later filed separate
motions in the trial court under Section 72 of the Civil Practice
Act, to vacate the default judgment. One of the defendants relied
upon his minority and the absence of representation by a guardian
ad lit em. The others pleaded an alleged non-negligent oversight
on the part of an insurance company which should have under-
taken a defense of the action.' 8 Finding that the minor defendant
was entitled to relief, the trial court vacated the judgment as to
him and then, apparently considering itself bound by the common
law concept since no specific authority appeared in the Practice
Act to the contrary,' 9 proceeded to reverse the judgment as to the
other defendants also. Following appeal from this action, the
15 The former practice is illustrated by the case of Livak v. Chicago & Erie R.
R. Co., 299 Ill. 218, 132 N. E. 524 (1921).
162 Ill. (2d) 568, 119 N. E. (2d) 24,7 (1954), affirming 350 Ill. App. 379, 113 N.
E. (2d) 69 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 179.
17 Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196.
is On this point, the court found a lack of diligence to be present, relying on the
holding in Wagner v. Sulka, 336 Ill. App. 101, 82 N. E. (2d) 922 (1948).
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 216, specifically authorizing "partial"
reversals, is designed to enumerate the powers of reviewing, rather than nigi prius,
tribunals.
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Supreme Court held that, except where the requirements of justice
dictated otherwise, both trial and reviewing courts possessed
authority to vacate or reverse a judgment in part while retaining
or affirming an existing judgment as to other parts or persons.
Dictum which had been expressed in the case of Minnis v. Friend
20
was there held to prevail over direct decisions to the contrary in
several intervening cases wherein the point appears to have been
overlooked.2'
It should also be noted that an application to vacate a judg-
ment taken by confession must, according to Supreme Court Rule
26, be accompanied by the defendant's affidavit disclosing the
presence of a prima facie defense on the merits. 22 While there is
authority, in that rule, for the plaintiff to file counter-affidavits,
the case of Lietz v. AnkroM23 would indicate that the issues thus
created are not to be resolved by the trial judge, as might be the
case with respect to motions made under Section 48 of the Civil
Practice Act,2 4 for it is then the function of the judge to do no
more than determine, as a matter of law, whether there is an
apparent prima facie defense and, if so, to then set the matter
for hearing on the controverted affidavits and other pleadings
which may have been interposed. Denial of a motion to open up
a judgment by confession was there reversed inasmuch as the
trial judge had acted to deal with the merits of the cause simply
on the basis of the affidavits so filed, described by the Appellate
Court as being a "vicious" practice in view of the fact the several
affiants were not subject to cross-examination.
Normally, the judgment of the trial court, when pronounced
and if not subjected to review, would afford a basis for the final
disposition of the cause under familiar principles relating to the
doctrine of res judicata. In that connection, the case of Voss
20360 Ill. 328, 196 N. E. 191 (1935). See also Crane v. Railway Express Agency,
369 Ill. 110, 15 N. E. (2d) 866 (1938), and Zahn v. Muscarello, 336 Ill. App. 188,
82 N. E. (2d) 504 (1948).
21 See Gray v. First National Bank of Chicago, 388 Ill. 124, 57 N. E. (2d) 363
(1944), and Fredrich v. Wolf, 383 Ill. 638, 50 N. E. (2d) 755 (1943).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.26.
23350 Ill. App. 437, 113 N. E. (2d) 184 (1953).
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172.
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Truck Lines v. Pike,25 one of the few truly significant procedural
decisions achieved during the year, is important for the court
there was asked to determine the conclusiveness of a judgment
which did not directly involve a full application of the doctrine
of res judicata but did carry overtones on the subject. The compli-
cated factual situation therein revealed a series of controversies
growing out of a highway collision between a truck and a tractor-
trailer unit in which one of the drivers died. The suit in question
started out as a property damage claim by the owner of the
trailer and the bailee thereof, who owned the tractor, to recover
for damage to the equipment. It was directed against the truck
owner, as employer, and the representative of the estate of the
deceased truck driver, as employee. In the meantime, a separate
personal injury suit had been filed by the driver of the tractor-
trailer unit against the truck owner, in which certain counter-
claims had been interposed, and this suit had been decided by a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff therein. A motion for summary
judgment was then made in the instant case predicated on the
ground that all factual issues had been resolved adversely to the
defendants there concerned by the verdict and judgment in the
interim suit and, as a consequence, nothing remained to be tried
as between the instant parties. The trial court, relying on an
estoppel by verdict, granted this motion but the Appellate Court
for the Third District reversed when it concluded that all issues
had not been so resolved since it was still possible that the plain-
tiffs may have been guilty of contributory negligence although it
had been affirmatively established that their driver was not so
guilty. The line of demarcation between the several cases and the
varied holdings with respect to the right of employer and employee
to have the benefit Of, or be exposed to detriment from, the out-
come of suits instituted by or against the other is not an easy one
to draw.26 The Appellate Court for the Second District, in the
case of Banas v. Jensen,27 appears to have achieved a somewhat
25350 Il1. App. 528, 113 N. E. (2d) 202 (1953), noted in 32 C ICAGo-KENT LAW
REvIEw 145, 42 I1. B. J. 315, and 1954 I1. L. Forum 145.
26 The cases are noted in a comment In 32 CHIoAO-KENT LAW REvIEw 145.
27 350 I. App. 582, 113 N. E. (2d) 590 (1953).
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comparable result except that there the survivors of an automobile
accident were held not to be in any way estopped by a verdict in
favor of the other driver in a wrongful death action filed by an
administrator in their behalf and based upon the death of a
member of their family produced by the same collision.
DAMAGES
Prior mention has been made of the holding in the case of
DeLude v. Rimnek 28 so it is important to note here simply that, on
the issue of the right of a tort-feasor to claim credit for amounts
paid by another for a covenant not to sue, the court refused to
limit the application of the rule to those who were truly joint tort-
feasors and guilty of a breach of the same duty but instead indi-
cated that relief by way of mitigation of damages was open to
all concerned in the one tort, provided the liability arose out of
the same circumstances, even though the bases for liability rested
on different duties.
Much more remarkable was the result achieved in the case
of Childers v. Modglin.29 The suit in question was one by a
spouse and the ten children of a person who had sustained a
permanent injury as the result of becoming intoxicated in taverns
operated by the defendants. Liability was predicated on the
Dram Shop Act30 with the several plaintiffs each seeking to re-
cover individual damages not in excess of the sum of $15,000. The
defendants moved to compel the plaintiffs to amend the complaint
so as to make the maximum aggregate recovery as to all plain-
tiffs subject to the $15,000 limit, which motion was sustained by
the trial court. Following a judgment dismissing the suit when
plaintiffs refused to amend, an appeal was taken to the Appel-
late Court for the Fourth District and it was there decided that
the statutory damage limitation was to be construed so as to
permit each injured plaintiff to recover up to, but not to exceed,
28 351 Iii. App. 460, 115 N. E. (2d) 561 (1953). See above, this section, notes 66
and 7, second series.
292 Ill. App. (2d) 292, 119 N. E. (2d) 519 (1954).
3o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
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the sum of $15,000 without regard to the existence of other claim-
ants or to the number of defendants. That interpretation, the
court said, was dictated by the fact that the statute created an
independent cause of action in favor of each near relative or the
like named in the statute rather than a class or joint action for
their benefit as is true under the statute dealing with wrongful
death cases.31 The extent of a particular tavern-keeper's liability
is, therefore, to be determined by the number of statutory bene-
ficiaries and the number of suits brought rather than by the num-
ber of persons whom he may cause, or permit, to become intoxi-
cated while on his premises.
It seldom happens that any doubt exists as to the persons
entitled to collect damages, most of the cases turning on ques-
tions relating to whether or not there is liability, and, if so, as
to the proper measure of recovery. Brief mention might, there-
fore, be made of the case of Kolin v. Leitch32 where the point was
urged that a corporation should not be permitted to offer a sug-
gestion with respect to damage, following dissolution of a tem-
porary injunction, 3 inasmuch as it had made no motion to va-
cate the same nor had it prosecuted any appeal therefrom. Judg-
ment in favor of the corporation was affirmed when it was made
to appear that all appropriate steps had been taken by the sev-
eral members of the board of directors of the corporation even
though they appeared to have acted more on behalf of themselves,
being co-defendants in the case, than on behalf of the entity.
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Relief from a trial court judgment comparable to that which
might be obtained on review before a higher tribunal may some-
times be obtained in the trial court by a motion in the nature
of a writ of error coram nobis.3 4 If a proceeding of this nature
31 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
32351 Il. App. 66, 113 N. E. (2d) 806 (1953), noted in 32 CMHCAGO-KLNT LAW
RErmW 187.
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 69, § 12.
34 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196.
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is undertaken more than five years after the judgment, 85 the case
of Petition of Ster.8 would indicate that new process would be
required,8 7 accompanied by proper service, and that jurisdiction
to vacate the judgment for errors of fact would not be obtained
by mere service of notice, particularly not where service was had
by mail on opposing parties then resident in another state. If
the motion is seasonably presented then, according to the case of
Schnable v. Tuma,38 it may be utilized on equitable grounds, even
in an action at law, to correct such mistakes as an error in the
return of process, for example in case the return should indi-
cate that actual personal service had been obtained when in fact
this was not so.
Assuming that an appeal to a higher tribunal is the proper
method to pursue, it should first be noticed that an appeal will
generally lie only from a "final" order of a lower court.8 9 Nothing
has been said to disturb the existing rules which bear on the
degree of finality present in an order of a trial court but the case
of Eckhardt v. Hickman" possesses significance on the question
of whether or not it would be proper for the Supreme Court to
grant leave to appeal from a decision of an Appellate Court which
decision, instead of serving to put all questions to rest, had re-
manded the cause for a new trial. Upon finding that the Appel-
late Court had, quite properly, reversed a judgment notwithstand-
ing a verdict and that Supreme Court Rule 22 did not require
that alternative motions for judgment or for new trial be pre-
sented simultaneously under penalty of waiver if not so pre-
sented, the Supreme Court then found the Appellate Court de-
35 The statute cited in the preceding footnote contains a five-year period of
limitation except as to persons under disability.
36 Sub nom. Stern v. Sheffield, 2 fI1. App. (2d) 311, 120 N. E. (2d) 62 (1954).
37 It is not clear whether the new process would be an ordinary summons, issued
pursuant to Section 5 of the Civil Practice Act, or would be something akin to a
writ of error authorized by Section 91 thereof. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol.
2, Ch. 110, § 259.62.
38351 Ill. App. 486, 115 N. E. (2d) 574 (1953).
39 In. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201. Provision for interlocutory appeal
in certain specified situations appears in ibid., Ch. 110, § 202.
402 Ill. (2d) 98, 116 N. E. (2d) 873 (1954).
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cision to be lacking in the essentials of finality4' so it dismissed
an appeal which it had previously granted on plaintiff's petition.4 -
Once the appeal has been providently taken, time begins to
run against the appellant for, under Rule 36 of the Supreme
Court,43 he is then under an obligation to file the record on appeal
within sixty days or face the penalty that his appeal will be dis-
missed in the event no proper extension of time has been granted.
The case of McDonald v. McDonald44 is important in that connec-
tion for it indicates that the sole authority of the trial judge to
grant extensions of time is limited to extensions for the purpose
of allowing a belated filing of a report of the proceedings at the
trial. Once that report has been filed with the trial judge, any
further extensions must be granted, if at all, by the reviewing
tribunal, not by the trial judge. As a consequence, the appeal
taken therein was dismissed although the appellant had filed the
record within the time fixed by a trial court order but at a time
which, unfortunately, fell beyond the normally allotted date, be-
cause the purported extension of time was held to be invalid for
lack of authority to grant the same.
The scope of jurisdiction to be exercised by a reviewing tri-
bunal is generally well understood, 45 but there is occasion, judging
by the outcome of the case of Kelly v. Winkler,46 to remind the bar
41 The court relied on Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 387 Ill. 204, 56 N. E. (2d) 420
(1944).
42 See also Olson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 1 Ill. (2d) 83, 115 N. E. (2d) 301
(1953), where an appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court, after
leave to appeal had been granted, was likewise dismissed in a situation where the
Appellate Court had reversed and remanded a cause for new trial and the plain-
tiff had not filed a certificate, in the form required by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 199 (2) (c), to the effect that, on the new trial, no other or additional
evidence would be adduced. An attack on the constitutionality of the statutory
provision for an alleged discrimination between plaintiffs and defendants was not
sustained as the court found a distinction existed between a truly final order and
one which, absent the certificate, was not final.
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.36(2) (a).
44 351 Ill. App. 432, 115 N. E. (2d) 567 (1953).
45 Mention has previously been made of the holding in the case of Chmielewski v.
Marich, 2 Ill. (2d) 568, 119 N. E. (2d) 247 (1954). See above, this section, notes
15 to 21, second series. That case, in effect, held that a trial court, as well as a
reviewing tribunal, possessed authority to vacate a judgment in part while re-
taining the judgment as to other parts or persons.
46 351 Ill. App. 145, 114 N. E. (2d) 335 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KEaT LAw
Riviw 180.
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that, if any amendment in the trial court proceedings is necessary,
such amendment must occur in the trial court for, despite language
in the Civil Practice Act to the contrary, 47 the several Appellate
Courts must act solely on the record as presented and may do
nothing to permit an amendment thereof.4" An effort there made
to correct an erroneous approval of a trial court order was re-
jected with the result that the appeal had to be dismissed since the




Following upon rendition of a judgment, the creditor may pur-
sue a variety of remedies to procure the collection thereof. He
may, for example, institute citation proceedings under Section 73
of the Civil Practice Act5" but, according to the case of Guest v.
Guest,51 if he does so, he may not turn the same into a proceeding
equivalent to a creditor's bill so as to reach property the title to
which is held by a third person. He may, likewise, utilize a gar-
nishment proceeding 2 but again subject to the limitation that the
garnishee be a person who is "indebted" to the judgment debtor
for if, as between them, no judgment or agreement exists whereby
the claim has become one of liquidated character that remedy is
not available. It was for this reason that garnishment was denied
in the case of Brock for use of Baumgarte v. Loga' 5 inasmuch as
the claim sought to be reached appeared to be one growing out of
a demand by the judgment debtor against the garnishee for failure
47111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 216(a), purports to authorize the re-
viewing court to "exercise all or any of the powers of amendment of the trial
court."
48 They may, of course, permit an addition to the record in the event that there
has been an omission.
49 See also Salitan v. Neff Feed Co., 351 Ill. App. 127, 114 N. E. (2d) 320 (1953),
where it was held that, in the event an amendment to a pleading was necessary to
make the same conform to the proofs, the amendment had to be made in the trial
court and could not be done by motion before the reviewing tribunal.
5O 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 197(2), as supplemented by Ch. 110,
§ 259.26A.
51351 Ill. App. 148, 114 N. E. (2d) 326 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 1 et seq.
53350 Ill. App. 425, 113 N. E. (2d) 197 (1953).
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to procure an insurance policy on a truck which had been con-
cerned in the principal cause of action, which claim had neither
been reduced to judgment nor made the subject of a specific agree-
ment as to the amount of coverage to be obtained.
Issues relating to garnishment as well as the right to use a
body execution were concerned in the case of Airo Supply Com-
pany v. Page.54 It appeared there that the judgment debtor,
while in the creditor's employment, had embezzled funds received
as a book-keeper, had suffered a term of imprisonment by reason
thereof, had been adjudged guilty in a civil suit to recover the
amount so embezzled, which judgment included a finding of malice
so as to support a body execution,55 but had later succeeded in
having this judgment vacated and a simple judgment substituted
therefor. Following his release from prison, the judgment debtor
had instituted bankruptcy proceedings and had procured a dis-
charge. He then sought to defeat a later garnishment proceeding
based on the civil judgment under the theory the discharge in
bankruptcy was an effective guard against the same but the Ap-
pellate Court for the First District reversed a decision in his favor
on the ground that, despite the absence of a finding of malice, the
principal defendant was not the "honest debtor" entitled to relief
but was, rather, one to be treated as a person who had obtained
funds by defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, 56 hence
not entitled to be protected by the discharge in bankruptcy.
A judgment creditor's attempt to procure satisfaction of his
judgment under a complaint in the nature of a creditor's bill col-
lided with claims advanced by a third-party contract beneficiary
in the case of Pliley v. Phifer.57 The assets in question consti-
tuted the debtor's share in a former partnership which had been
dissolved by agreement prior to the principal judgment with the
liquidating partner retaining the debtor's share for the purpose
of satisfying certain of the debtor's obligations, including therein
54 2 Ill. App. (2d) 264, 119 N. E. (2d) 400 (1954), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RmriEw 343.
55 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 5.
56 11 U. S. C. A. § 35(4).
57 1 Ill. App. (2d) 398, 117 N. E. (2d) 678 (1954).
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a claim due a certain bank on outstanding notes held by it, exe-
cuted by the judgment debtor for non-trade indebtedness, which
were then in default. The issue so produced required a determina-
tion not only of the question of priority between the judgment
creditor and the bank but also whether or not the agreement be-
tween the former partners amounted to a non-revocable third-
party beneficiary contract in favor of the bank which was not a
contracting party but had generally been informed of the arrange-
ment and had "relaxed" its efforts to obtain satisfaction because
of the presence thereof. The trial court found for the plaintiff
but the Appellate Court for the First District reversed when it
concluded that the arrangement, in effect, amounted to a prior
assignment in favor of the bank which took precedence over plain-
tiff's judgment and execution. It should be noted, however, that
no fraud or fraudulent conveyance was involved.
While the decision turned on Ohio law, the case of Welch v.
Doums 5s is worth mention for it illustrates certain of the prob-
lems a judgment creditor may face in the event he seeks to obtain
local enforcement on a foreign judgment. The plaintiff therein
had originally obtained an Ohio deficiency judgment in a mortgage
foreclosure case wherein the defendant, although not an Ohio resi-
dent, had filed a general appearance. No attempt was made to
revive this judgment until more than twenty years after its ren-
dition, during all of which time the debtor had remained a non-
resident of Ohio. Notice with respect to the revival proceeding
was given by publication. Thereafter the creditor sued in Illinois
on the Ohio judgment so revived but was met with a claim that
the original judgment was barred under a five-year Illinois limi-
tation statute, 9 that it had not been kept alive by reason of the
debtor's absence from the state, and that the service by publication
in the revival proceeding was inadequate inasmuch as the proceed-
ing was one of in personam character, requiring the use of per-
sonal service in Ohio, rather than a suit in rein. The Appellate
Court for the Third District, affirming a judgment for the debtor,
581 Ill. App. (2d) 424, 118 N. E. (2d) 51 (1954).
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16, has been construed to be applicable to
suits on foreign judgments: Davis v. Munie, 235 Ill. 620, 85 N. E. 943 (1908).
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indicated that the steps taken may have been sufficient to give the
Ohio judgment a renewed effect in Ohio as against an Ohio resi-
dent but were inadequate to bind the Illinois resident as to whom
the original judgment had long since become barred.60
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
There is no indication that the Illinois reviewing tribunals had
fewer criminal cases to consider this year than in former years,
but the list of cases in which new points of law were concerned
was relatively small and most of those on the list dealt with pro-
cedural questions. Among those concerned with substantive defi-
nitions of criminal conduct are the related cases of People v. Dor-
man' and People v. Balkin2 in which the defendants concerned were
prosecuted for having violated that section of the Criminal Code
which prohibits conspiracies to commit illegal acts injurious to the
public trade, health, morals, police, and the administration of public
justice.3 In the first of these cases, the alleged illegal act forming
the basis of the conspiracy was the conduct of bookmaking; 4 in the
other, the alleged illegal act concerned the selling of horse-meat
without the required labeling.5 In each instance, the illegal act
charged as the basis of the conspiracy was of the grade of mis-
demeanor whereas the crime of conspiracy ranks as a felony. The
question presented, therefore, was one as to whether or not a con-
federation formed to make book or to engage in the illegal dis-
tribution of horse-meat constituted a conspiracy as defined in the
Criminal Code. In each instance, the rule of eiusdem. generis
6
was applied with the result that the phrase "illegal act injurious
60 The court placed a degree of reliance on the analogous case of Sutton v. Hole,
349 Ill. App. 219, 110 N. E. (2d) 455 (1953).
1415 Ill. 385, 114 N. E. (2d) 404 (1953), affirming 347 Il1. App. 317, 106 N. E. (2d)
842 (1952), noted in 32 CIIcAG0-KENT LAW REviEw 47.
2 351 Ill. App. 95, 113 N. E. (2d) 813 (1953).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 139.
4 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 336.
5 Ibid., Ch. 562, § 248, prohibits the possession of meat of the varieties named
therein unless the same is "plainly labeled or tagged with the words 'Horse Meat'."
6 That rule directs that where general words follow specific words in a statute,
the general words must be construed to include only those things of the kind indi-
cated by the specific words.
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to public trade, health, morals, police or the administration of
justice ' 7 was held to be limited in meaning and to refer only to
those illegal acts specifically mentioned," hence did not apply to
the basic acts concerned in the two cases.
The crime of receiving stolen property9 was reviewed in the
case of People v. Holtzman ° and the opinion therein rather pre-
cisely states the law in Illinois on the subject. The facts of the
case were that the defendant had purchased seven shirts from one
Reynolds for $1.00 each, which shirts, reasonably worth $20.00,
previously had been stolen from a department store by Reynolds
and were identifiable by a brand mark on the collars. The court
held that the prosecution would be obliged to prove (1) that the
property had, in fact, been stolen by a person other than the one
charged with receiving it; (2) that the one charged with receiving
it had actually received the property stolen or aided in concealing
it; (3) that the receiver knew the property was stolen at the time
of receiving it; and (4) that he received the property for his own
use and to prevent the owner from again possessing the same.
Although the prosecution could not prove, by direct evidence, the
existence of defendant's guilty knowledge that the goods were
stolen, circumstantial evidence to the effect that the property was
purchased for substantially less than the reasonable worth thereof,
the defendant's knowledge that Reynolds was then presently under
indictment for grand larceny, and the defendant's evasive tactics
when his place of business was searched, were deemed to be suf-
ficient to carry the burden of proof for the state. In so ruling,
the court announced that it was not necessary to show actual
guilty knowledge by the receiver but proof of circumstances suffi-
cient to induce a belief in a reasonable mind that the goods were
stolen would satisfy the requirement.
Along the same general line, it should be noted that an ele-
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 139.
8 Among the specific crimes mentioned in the statute are such offenses as boy-
cotting, blacklisting, obtaining money under false pretense, as well as the com-
mon law offense of conspiring to commit a felony.
9 Ii1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 492.
101 111. (2d) 562, 116 N. E. (2d) 358 (1953).
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ment of criminal intent is required in the crime of possessing bur-
glar's tools with intent to commit a felony."' The only prior in-
terpretation of this statutory crime had indicated that the proof of
intent had to be something more than an inference which might
be drawn from the mere possession of instruments commonly used
by burglars, 12 but the question as to the type of intent needed was
there, necessarily, left open. In the case of People v. Taranto,
3
the defendant had been indicted and convicted under the statute
for having burglar's tools in his possession with intent to break
into the dwelling house of one Dana Summers and to commit lar-
ceny therein. 14 The prosecution had failed to prove that the de-
fendant intended to break into the particular dwelling mentioned
in the indictment but the circumstantial evidence did warrant a
finding that the defendant intended to commit the crime of larceny.
The question was raised as to whether or not the state had to prove
the precise intent stated in the indictment. The question was an-
swered in the negative on the theory that the statute did not re-
quire an allegation in the indictment of an intent to break into any
particular building; that any allegation to that effect was im-
material; and that only material allegations had to be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt. It should be noted, however, that the
court did not say that the prosecution, under the statute, was re-
lieved from proving the existence of a specific intent to commit a
felony for it is clear that the presence of a general intent would
not be sufficient.15
The degree of participation in the crime of murder which
would be necessary to constitute an accused person as being a
principal was considered in the case of People v. Grilec.'8 The
testimony there presented indicated that the defendant had been
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38 § 87.
12 See People v. Taylor, 410 Ill. 469, 102 N. E. (2d) 529 (1951), noted in 30 CHI-
CAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 278.
13 2 Ill. (2d) 476, 119 N. E. (2d) 221 (1953).
14 The defendant was indicted on two counts. The second count alleged an attempt
to commit burglary but the defendant was found not guilty on this count.
15 Miller, Handbook on Criminal Law- (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1934),
p. 59.
16 2 In. (2d) 538, 119 N. E. (2d) 232 (1954).
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at hand during the commission of the crime and, by his words and
conduct, had signified his approval of, and encouragement in, the
perpetration thereof.17 Although the testimony as to the defend-
ant's presence at the time was contradictory and the evidence in-
dicating the defendant's approval was sketchy at best, the court
was of the opinion that, in the event the evidence was believed by
the jury, the proof was sufficient to show an aiding and abetting.
The court was careful to note that presence alone would have been
insufficient.
Two other minor points might be noted. Whether the ele-
ment of secret confinement, proof of which is necessary to sustain
a charge of kidnapping,' 8 would be satisfied when the victim was
being confined in an automobile moving over the public highways
was discussed in the case of People v. Bishop.19 The court did not
decide the question, but it did clearly state, in the opinion, that
there well could be a secret confinement in such a situation. The
case of People v. Lackaye20 indicates that the offense of keeping
a house of ill fame 21 extends to the maintenance of an establish-
ment where homosexuals congregate for the offense is not limited
simply to houses where illicit relationships between members of
opposite sexes occur.
In the realm of criminal procedure, it would first be appropri-
ate to consider the related cases of People ex rel. Gilbert v. Babb
22
and People ex rel. Millet v. Babb,23 wherein the Illinois Supreme
Court was confronted with an interpretation problem arising
under the statute relating to fugitives from justice.2' This statute
implements provisions of the United States Constitution 2 and at-
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 582, defines the conduct required of an
accessory before the fact.
18 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 384.
19 1 Ill. (2d) 60, 114 N. E. (2d) 566 (1953), cert. den.-U. S.-, 74 S. Ct. 278,
98 L. Ed. (adv.) 174 (1953).
201 Il. (2d) 618, 116 N. E. (2d) 359 (1953).
21 Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 162.
22415 Ill. 349, 114 N. E. (2d) 358 (1953), noted in 42 Ill. B. J. 248.
23 1 Il. (2d) 191, 115 N. E. (2d) 241 (1953), noted in 3 DePaul L. Rev. 289.
24 Ill, Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 60, § 1 et seq.
25 U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2.
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tendant federal legislation 26 and establishes two procedures by
which a fugitive may be apprehended and extradited to the de-
manding state.27  In the first case, the fugitive contended that,
once proceedings had been commenced before a judicial officer
under the quasi-judicial method of extradition, the governor had
no right to issue a direct writ of extradition, pursuant to the
executive method, until proceedings before the court had been com-
pleted. On finding that the fugitive had waived further court
proceedings by asking for, and receiving, a hearing before the
governor on the executive writ of extradition, the court held that
any question as to the propriety of the action taken had been re-
moved from the case. In the other case, the fugitive had not waived
further court proceedings but it was held that the issuance of a
governor's rendition warrant, in compliance with the executive
method, precluded further judicial hearings. It is clear, there-
fore, that the two methods for extradition described in the state
statute are not exclusive of one another.
28
The case of People v. Hammond29 appears to have bearing on
the subject of the jurisdiction which a state court may exercise
over criminal acts committed against federal property located
within the state. The defendant there concerned had been in-
dicted and convicted for burglarizing an office maintained by the
United States Government for use by the Department of Internal
Revenue located in Cook County.30 The defendant, on writ of
error, urged that the state was without jurisdiction to punish be-
cause the offense charged was committed on and against federal
property. It was, however, held that in the absence of a showing
by the defendant of the existence of an exclusive federal jurisdic-
26 18 U. S. C. A. § 3182 et seq.
27 Sections 1 and 2 of the Illinois statute set forth the so-called executive mode
for extradition based upon a direct application for a writ of extradition made by
the demanding state to the governor of the asylum state. Sections 3 and 4 thereof
provide for a second, or so-called quasi-judicial method, based upon a complaint
under oath presented to any judge, justice of the peace or police magistrate.
28 It may be noted that the alleged fugitive is entitled to a hearing upon applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus under either procedure.
291 Ill. -(2d) 65, 115 N. E. (2d) 331 (1953), cert. den.-U. S.-, 74 S. Ct. 380, 98
L. Ed. (adv.) 238 (1954).
30 The prosecution was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 89 et seq.
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tion, the state had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal govern-
ment at least in cases where the criminal act was also a violation
of state law.3 Such being the case, the state court sentence was
affirmed.
Little of consequence has been decided with regard to the
technical form of, or allegations in, the indictment on which the
criminal prosecution is based. One of three defendants, jointly
charged with robbery in People v. Erwin,32 attempted to argue
that an interpolated phrase in the body of the indictment, one
which charged a co-defendant with being armed at the time, had
operated to make the balance of the allegations of the indictment
applicable solely to the armed person, thereby causing it to fail
to charge any crime on the part of the particular defendant. The
court refused to give any credence to the argument, pointing out
that well-recognized rules of punctuation governed the situation
before it. 33 In another case, that of People v. Schrader,84 a three-
count indictment charged a burglary of premises belonging to a
corporation but also contained a count for larceny of personal
property belonging to a named individual without specific ref-
erence to the fact that the offenses were committed simultaneously
or that the personalty so stolen had been removed from the bur-
glarized premises. A motion to quash for misjoinder of offenses
was denied but, at the ensuing trial, the jury found the defendant
guilty of burglary only, thereby impliedly bringing in a verdict
of not guilty as to the larceny. The defendant nevertheless sought
review on the ground he had been prejudiced by the alleged
misjoinder but his conviction was affirmed when the court indicated
that, nothing being alleged to the contrary, the presumption would
be that the several offenses were parts of, or related to, the same
transaction, hence the counts had been properly joined.
31 Even where exclusive jurisdiction over lands within the state has been yielded
to the federal government, it has been customary to preserve a degree of state
authority. See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 143, §§ 14, 21, 27, 32,
34 and 36.
321 Ill. (2d) 594, 116 N. E. (2d) 383 (1954).
33 But see People v. Hallberg, 259 Ill. 502, 102 N. E. 1005 (1913), to the effect
that a joint indictment may be turned into a single one through the use of singular,
rather than plural, language.
34 2 Ill. (2d) 212, 117 N. E. (2d) 786 (1954). Petitions for certiorari have been
denied:- U. S.-, 74 S. Ct. 855 and 858, 98 L. Ed. (adv.) 722 and 723 (1954).
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The decision in the case of People v. Yeargai 3 5 would also
appear to have lightened the burden of the prosecution in charging
certain of the narcotic offenses. 30 The defendant argued the in-
dictment was insufficient for failure to negative certain exceptions
in the nature of the potential offense, relying on an earlier case
which had so required. 7 Noting that the statutory phrasing of
the offense had, in the meantime, been changed and a specific pro-
vision added which placed the burden on the defendant to prove
that he was entitled to the benefit of the exception,38 the court
was able to reject the earlier holding and find the indictment
before it sufficient to sustain the conviction. Brief mention might
also be made of the case of People v. Moretti"9 for the light it
sheds on the power of a trial court to appoint a special prosecutor
to present matters to the grand jury whenever the official state's
attorney is, or may be, disqualified to act.
An important decision of interest in counties where the popula-
tion exceeds 140,000 but is less than 250,000 was announced on writ
of error in the case of People v. Johnson.40 The defendant there
concerned had challenged the validity of the array on the ground
the prospective trial jurors had not been selected in conformity
with the provisions of the Jury Commissioners Act, a statute
which, by amendment in 1939, had been made applicable to counties
of the size mentioned,4 1 although the panel had been chosen in
compliance with the Jurors Act, a statute still applicable in the
smaller counties of the state. 42 It had been decided, in People v.
No rdell,43 that a grand jury of the county selected by the latter
rather than the former method was not invalid because the two
statutes were regarded as supplementing each other, at least
35 3 111. (2d) 25, 119 N. E. (2d) 752 (1954).
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.1 et seq.
37 See People v. Sowrd, 370 IlI. 140, 18 N. E. (2d) 176, 119 A. L. R. 1396 (1938).
38 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.21.
39415 Ill. 398, 114 N. E. (2d) 337 (1953), affirming 349 I1. App. 67, 109 N. E.
(2d) 915 (1952).
402 Ill. (2d) 165, 117 N. E. (2d) 91 (1954).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 78, § 24 et seq., as amended by Laws 1939, p.
493.
42 Ibid., Ch. 78, §§ 1-23.
43414 Ill. 375, 111 N. E. (2d) 555 (1953).
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until the county acted to operate under the jury commissioner
system. Since the county in question had not yet so elected, the
conviction in the Johnson case was affirmed on the ground that
the principle controlling with respect to grand juries was equally
applicable to trial juries. A mere increase in county population,
therefore, will not result in any wholesale invalidation of indict-
ments or convictions.
The defendant in a criminal case is not only entitled to a
trial by a properly constituted jury but he is also guaranteed a
speedy trial4 4 which, as to persons held without bail, has been
defined by legislative enactment to be a trial commencing within
four months from the date of commitment, with certain excep-
tions. 45 Reliance was placed on this "four term" act by the de-
fendant in the case of People v. Rogers46 under a set of facts
showing detention in Cook County for over two months, followed
by a surrender to Lake County authorities when it appeared
that venue of the offense properly belonged in Lake County, ac-
companied by a further period of detention of less than four
months in duration in the last-named county but aggregating a
total period of incarceration slightly in excess of six months. His
motion for discharge was held properly denied on the ground the
first county lacked jurisdiction for any purpose so the only sig-
nificant but insufficient period of detention had occurred in Lake
County.4 7 Inasmuch as the detention, in whatever county, is for
the benefit of the state at large, there is some reason to believe
that the state should be required to act more promptly, or take
the consequence of its failure so to do, within the over-all period
prescribed by the legislature to prevent the possibility of harass-
ing an accused person.
More successful from the defendant's standpoint was the out-
come of the case of People v. Tamborski,48 a case in which the
44 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 9.
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 748.
46 415 Il. 343, 114 N. E. (2d) 398 (1953).
47 The court relied on the case of People v. Stiiwagon, 373 Inl. 211, 25 N. E. (2d)
795 (1940), a case involving substantially similar facts.
48 415 Ill. 466, 114 N. E. (2d) 649 (1953).
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prosecution sought to excuse its failure to begin the trial within
the four-month period on the ground the delay was caused by
time necessarily taken to hear and rule on certain other defensive
motions for discharge based upon other alleged failures to prose-
cute promptly. The court indicated that the delay was not sought
by the defendant49 who was, in fact, insisting upon a prompt trial,
nor was he the cause of the delay since his motions could have
been disposed of more expeditiously. As a consequence, it was
held that the defendant was entitled to have his conviction re-
versed and to be set at liberty.
Certain issues of proof and trial procedure are of such na-
ture that they can only arise in connection with criminal prose-
cutions, being foreign to civil cases. In that category are those
issues which may be generated when a defendant seeks to ex-
clude or suppress proof secured as the result of an alleged illegal
search and seizure. Noteworthy among the new holdings in that
connection is the decision in People v. Dolgin,50 a case wherein
a search was conducted, under a warrant issued for the pur-
pose,"1 by a member of the state highway police department
specially assigned to the Department of Revenue to investigate
violations of the Cigarette Tax Act.5 2  Objection to the search
and seizure was based on the theory the warrant was in the
nature of civil process, hence could not be executed by a high-
way policeman,5 3 but the court, treating the policeman as a "peace
officer" and the warrant as a form of criminal process, sustained
the seizure and a conviction based thereon.
Search without a warrant also breeds problems, as is illus-
trated by two cases. In the first, that of People v. Tillman, 54 cer-
tain police officers, acting on suspicion provoked by an anony-
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 748, provides for an extension of time in
the event the delay "shall happen on the application of the prisoner."
5 415 Ill. 434, 114 N. E. (2d) 389 (1953), noted in 1954 II. L. Forum 336.
51 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 692.
52 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.1 et seq.
93 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 121, § 307.16, specifying the powers of such officers, states:
"No person employed under this Act . . . shall serve or execute civil process."
541 Ill. (2d) 525, 116 N. E. (2d) 344 (1954). Maxwell, J., concurred specially.
Klingbiel, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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mous telephone call, went to a hotel room used as defendant's
residence and, on gaining entrance through a partly-opened door,
made an arrest. They thereafter searched the bed on which de-
fendant had been sleeping at the time and under the mattress
thereof found narcotics. The evidence so obtained was held to
be lawfully admitted on the theory the search of the bed follow-
ing the arrest was not an unreasonable one under the circum-
stances, the bed being, in a fair sense, no more than a projection
of the person of the defendant. By contrast, in the case of People
v. Albea,5 5 another narcotics case, it was held, for the first time
in this state, that the prosecution could not have the advantage
of testimony supplied by a human being who had not been known
to exist until after the illegal search had been made since the
case, in principle, was identical with those cases in which papers,
documents, records, or other property had been obtained in an
unconstitutional fashion.
Somewhat related to the problem of suppression of evidence
is the matter of securing the return of fingerprint records, photo-
graphs, and other police-file data in the event the accused person
is acquitted or released without being convicted3 6 This has, at
times, been accomplished by means of an order of court entered
at the time of discharge and in conjunction with the criminal
proceeding. The case of Maxwell v. O'Con~orI7 notes that relief
of this character may not be obtained by a subsequent petition
presented to another court, even though such court possesses
jurisdiction over criminal matters. The decision, beyond noting
that the right sought to be protected partakes more nearly of
the nature of a right of privacy to be enforced, if at all, in a
civil case before a civil court, 58 distinguished the situation be-
fore it from the one involved when evidence illegally seized has
been ordered suppressed.
552 Ill. (2d) 317, 118 N. U. (2d) 277 (1954), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
REvImw 349.
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 780e, directs that such matter shall be
returned.
57 1 Ill. App. (2d) 124, 117 N. E. (2d) 326 (1953).
58 See note in 25 CMwAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 166 to the Indiana case of State
ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N. E. (2d) 755 (1946), dealing with the
right to use mandamus for this purpose.
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A seeming inconsistency with respect to proof of the age
of a defendant charged with rape might be noted from a super-
ficial comparison of two cases decided about the same time. A
conviction was reversed in one of the cases, that of People v.
Rogers,59 because the sole proof as to age rested on the defend-
ant's extra-judicial confession plus such inference as the jury
might draw from observation of the defendant's person at the
trial, neither of which was regarded as being legal evidence on
the point. In People v. Ventura,6" however, where no evidence of
any kind bearing on the defendant's age was introduced by the
prosecution, the conviction was affirmed when the court said that
the responsibility rested on the defendant to prove that he was
under the age referred to in the statute.61 The two cases may
be distinguished on the fact that the first involved a charge of
statutory rape, where the age of the parties is an unquestionable
element of the corpus delicti,6 2 whereas the second dealt with
the offense of forcible rape and the defendant had made proof
on the point unnecessary by a judicial confession in the form of
a plea of guilty. Whatever the rule may be with respect to in-
ferences or presumptions relating to age, the case of People v.
Meier6 4 makes it clear that, on a charge of being an habitual
criminal, a presumption will be indulged in that there was not
only a prior conviction but that the accused was also incarcerated
thereunder 65 and the burden is on the defendant to prove the
contrary.66
59 415 Ill. 343, 114 N. E. (2d) 398 (1953).
60415 Ill. 587, 114 N. E. (2d) 710 (1953).
61 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 490.
62 Wistrand v. People, 213 Ill. 72, 72 N. E. 748 (1904).
63 The rule of People v. Schultz, 260 Ill. 35, 102 N. E. 1045 (1913), was there
affirmed.
64 3 111. (2d) 29, 119 N. E. (2d) 792 (1954).
65 Actual incarceration is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of aggravated
punishment: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 602. Compare People v. Perkins,
395 Ill. Z53, 70 N. E. (2d) 622 (1947), with People v. Del Veawgo, 399 Ill. 243, 77
N. E. (2d) 668 (1948).
66 The case is also authority for the rule that the jury need do no more than
find that the defendant "has been heretofore convicted" of the earlier offense by
name without being obliged to set forth the details thereof in the verdict. See also
People v. Pitts, 401 I1. 154, 81 N. E. (2d) 442 (1948).
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Notice could also be taken of the procedural problem involved
in the case of People v. Kirkendoll, 7 a case in which a negro
defendant had requested the court to instruct the jury that it
was the duty of the jury "to consider the prisoner's case as if
he were a white man, for the law is the same as to both white
and colored men, there being no distinction in principles in respect
to color," but which request had been denied. Pointing to the
fact that, ninety-nine years earlier, it had approved the giving of
an instruction containing identical language, 68 the Supreme Court
declared the refusal constituted substantial error, saying that
"practical justice" dictated the necessity for a new trial.6 9
Sentencing procedure was made the subject of inquiry in
several cases. In one of them, that of People v. Molz, 70 criticism
was addressed to the conduct of the trial judge on the probation
hearing 7' in that no specific order had been entered denying
probation, although a full hearing had been had prior to the time
the sentence order itself was entered. Recognizing that an order
granting probation would be essential to preserve jurisdiction,7
2
the Supreme Court nevertheless held that, although a formal
order denying probation might be desirable to complete the
record, the act of the trial court in imposing sentence was sufficient
to operate as a denial of the application for probation, so the
alleged error was, at best, a harmless one. An inadvertent and
involuntary absence of the defendant from the court-room at the
moment of sentence was the point of error relied on in the case of
People v. Kirilenko.73 The court agreed that error had been com-
mitted in this respect, for the defendant had a right to be present
at this important stage of the proceeding, but the reversal of the
judgment did little to favor the defendant for the case was
remanded with a direction to set the record aside only as far back
67415 Ill. 404, 114 N. E. (2d) 459 (1953), noted in 34 Bost. U. L. Rev. 95.
68 See Campbell v. People, 16 Ill. 17 (1854).
69415 Ill. 404 at 411, 114 N. E. (2d) 459 at 462.
70415 Ill. 183, 113 N. E. (2d) 314 (1953).
71 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 784 et seq.
72 People v. Cahill, 300 Il1. 279, 133 N. E. 229 (1921).
731 Ill. (2d) 90, 115 N. E. (2d) 297 (1953).
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as the point at which the error occurred, leaving all anterior
proceedings to stand in full force and effect. Mention having
been made last year of the Appellate Court holding in People v.
Davis, 74 a case dealing with the power of the judge, rather than
the jury, to impose punishment in case of a violation of the Motor
Vehicle Act,75 it is proper to note here that the Supreme Court, on
writ of error, affirmed the holding therein on the ground the
sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code 76 were inapplicable
and, for want of other legislative direction, common-law principles
would have to control.
77
Indeterminate sentence being now an established policy in
this state for most offenses,78 it has become the duty of the trial
court to fix minimum and maximum limits upon the period of
imprisonment specified in the judgment order. A slight grammati-
cal error in that respect will, according to the holding in People
v. Wall,7 9 be insufficient to require reversal. It was there said that
a sentence for armed robbery to run for "not less than one (1)
year or life" did not amount to two alternative determinate
sentences but was the equivalent of a minimum-maximum sentence
"for one (1) year or for life," hence was well within applicable
statutory limits.80 More startling, however, is the decision in the
case of People v. King,81 also an armed robbery case but one which
included a charge of murder growing out of the same occurrence.8 2
The sentence there imposed specified a minimum term of 199 years
and a maximum of imprisonment for life which, the defendant
74349 Ill. App. 398, 110 N. E. (2d) 833 (1953), noted in 32 CMCAGO-KENT LAW
REvrEw 53.
75 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 145.
76 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 754a.
77 People v. Davis, 1 Ill. (2d) 597, 116 N. E. (2d) 372 (1954).
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 801 et seq.
793 Ill. (2d) 11, 119 N. E. (2d) 780 (1954).
80 Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 501.
811 II. (2d) 496, 116 N. E. (2d) 623 (1954), noted in 42 Ill. B. J. 512. Maxwell,
J., wrote a specially concurring opinion on the ground a defendant has no right to
insist upon the specification of any minimum term and may complain only if the
maximum sentence exceeds the prescribed limit.
82 A sentence to death on the murder charge was reversed because the court
believed the defendant had pleaded guilty thereto on an erroneous reliance upon
a promise of leniency with respect thereto.
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urged, was far from an indeterminate sentence since the alleged
minimum exceeded the ordinary life span, thereby operating to
make parole impossible. Inasmuch as a "life for life" sentence
had been condemned in People v. Westbrook,3 there was reason
to believe that a stated term measured in years which would exceed
a normal lifetime was likewise open to criticism. The Supreme
Court, nevertheless, affirmed the sentence when it refused to
"speculate upon the life expectancy of those convicted of crime
in determining the propriety of the sentences which have been
imposed upon them. "4 The way would, therefore, seem to have
been made clear for the imposition by trial courts of what are,
essentially, determinate sentences leading to permanent incarcera-
tion"5 despite an apparent policy to the contrary.
The workings of the Post Conviction Hearing Act8" are fur-
ther illustrated by two recent holdings. In one case, that of
People v. Wakat, 7 the alleged errors at the original trial were
said to consist in the use of an extorted confession and the knowing
use by the prosecution of perjured testimony. These charges were
established, to the satisfaction of the court hearing the post-
conviction petition, by new evidence not previously submitted, as
the result of which a new trial was ordered. The prosecution, on
writ of error,88 claimed that neither investigation into issues
previously litigated nor the receipt of new evidence were permis-
sible in connection with post-conviction proceedings but the Su-
preme Court, following the rationale of People v. Jennings,89
refused to give any mechanical application to the doctrine of res
judicata and, in addition, indicated that the hearing court was
required to use any proper procedure, including the admission of
83 411 Ill. 301, 103 N. E. (2d) 494, 29 A. L. R. 1341 (1952).
84 1 Ill. (2d) 496 at 503, 116 N. E. (2d) 623 at 626.
85 Except as relief may be obtained pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Cr.
38, § 801.1.
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 826 et seq.
87415 Ill. 610, 114 N. E. (2d) 706 (1953), noted in 1953 Ill. L. Forum 655.
88 The writ of error is usually not available for use by the prosecution but, as a
post-conviction hearing is essentially a civil proceeding in the nature of a writ
of error corarn nobis, it would appear that the prosecution, under Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 832, should be entitled to seek review of an adverse decision.
89 411 Ill. 21, 102 N. E. (2d) 824 (1952).
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new evidence if relevant, in the discharge of its duty to ascertain
whether there had been a denial of constitutional right at the first
trial. In the other case, that of People v. Joyce,e0 the primary
issue concerned dealt with the question as to whether or not the
prosecution was entitled to seek review of an order vacating an
earlier conviction or was obliged to await the outcome of the new
trial so granted. Upholding the right of the prosecution to secure
an early review, the Supreme Court then proceeded to consider
whether any ground for post-conviction relief existed in the case.
In that regard, the court indicated the convicted defendant had
no reason to complain of an instruction, originally given at the
instance of the prosecution, which had informed the jury that
they were judges of both the law and the facts, even though such
an instruction was later held to be manifestly erroneous,9' since
the instruction was actually harmless in its operation. As the
giving of the instruction would have been inadequate to procure
reversal on direct review,92 it was treated as being equally inade-
quate for the purpose of post-conviction relief.9 3
V. FAMILY LAW
The much publicized "cooling-off" provision' which had
been added to the Divorce Act in 1953 became the object of judi-
cial scrutiny in the case of People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell.2
It will be recalled that, by this addition, it was necessary for any
individual desiring to institute an action for divorce, separate
maintenance or annulment to file a declaration of such intention
at least sixty days prior to the filing of a complaint, during which
interval, voluntary conciliatory conferences could be held between
901 Iii. (2d) 225, 115 N. E. (2d) 262 (1953).
91 See People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N. E. 400 (1931).
92 People v. Fedora, 393 Ill. 165, 65 N. E. (2d) 447 (1946).
93 The court also Indicated that an incarcerated defendant could hardly be
expected to procure even so much as a "bystander" bill of exceptions to support
direct review, hence could not be held to have waived any right to complain of
the conviction by reason of his failure to secure relief in the more direct fashion
customarily utilized.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § § 23-9, added by Laws 1953, p. 284.
2 Ill. (2d) 332, 118 N. E. (2d) 262 (1954), noted In 42 Ill. B. J. 714.
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the parties with the court acting as mediator. In that mandamus
proceeding, it was urged that the statute was unconstitutional
inasmuch as (1) it denied an individual free and prompt access
to the courts,3 and (2) it attempted to impose non-judicial func-
tions upon judicial tribunals.4  Following an adverse judgment,
the petitioner appealed directly to the Supreme Court because
a constitutional issue was involved and that court reversed when
it decided that the provision in question did violate constitu-
tional guarantees. An argument to the effect that, since the right
to a divorce or separation was based upon a legislative grant
and did not rest on the common law, the legislature could impose
any limits it wished was refuted on the premise that, as soon as
a judicial remedy has been created, constitutional safeguards be-
come applicable thereto. As to the attempt to cast the court in
the role of mediator, a contention was made that this function
was judicial in character, being closely analogous to the pre-trial
conference, 5 but the court did not agree, pointing to the fact
that the pre-trial conference occurs after jurisdiction has been
obtained through the filing of an initial pleading whereas the
conference envisioned by the "cooling-off" provision was to be
held before any action had been instituted.
A goodly number of decisions this year involved questions
concerning rights to alimony and support. One of these, that
achieved in the case of Pope v. Pope,6 revolved around a full
faith and credit issue in relation to a foreign decree. It appeared
therein that an Illinois wife had secured a separate maintenance
decree from an Illinois court which had been followed by a
Nevada divorce obtained by the husband as on default. The
husband ceased making support payments and, on the wife's
petition for the recovery thereof, he contended that he was no
longer obligated to pay because of his Nevada decree, urging that
the Illinois court had to give full faith and credit thereto since
the domiciliary jurisdiction of the Nevada tribunal had not been
3 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
4 Ibid, Art. III.
5 Inl. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 182a and § 259.23A.
62 Il1. (2d) 152, 117 N. E. (2d) 65 (1954).
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contested. The lower court upheld the husband's argument but,
on direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, saying it was only
necessary to give credit to the Nevada decree to the extent that
the tribunal of that state had jurisdiction over the cause. While
that decree might be regarded as producing a valid determina-
tion with reference to the marital status of the parties, it was
said not to affect the wife's rights under the prior separate main-
tenance order, especially since the Nevada court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the wife and had not attempted to adjudicate
her rights in that respect.
Another and somewhat analogous problem, but one as to ali-
mony rather than separate maintenance, was the concern of the
Appellate Court for the First District in the case of Linneman
v. Linneman.7 The plaintiff there had obtained an Illinois divorce
and was allowed periodic alimony. She remarried in Illinois and
then became a resident of California where she obtained an annul-
ment of her second marriage on the ground of the impotency of
her second spouse. Upon the refusal of her first husband to
renew alimony payments, the plaintiff sought a contempt citation
and relied on the California annulment decree as establishing the
fact that a valid second marriage had never been contracted.
The trial court refused to recognize this argument and, upon
appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed. It rested this conclusion
upon the fact that, according to the conflict of laws theory, the
validity of a marriage is to be determined by the laws of the state
wherein the marriage was celebrated. As Illinois does not recog-
nize impotency as impairing the original validity of a marriage, 8
it followed that the plaintiff had contracted a valid second marri-
age and her right to alimony from the first husband had ceased.
An alimony decision of first impression may be found in
the case of Larson v. Larson,9 a case wherein a husband had
71 Ill. App. (2d) 48, 116 N. E. (2d) 182 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KaiNT LAw
REviEw 262, 3 DePaul L. Rev. 284, and 42 Ill. B. J. 586.
s There would appear to be no inherent power to grant an annulment on the
ground of impotency since it is not a civil disability. As a result, jurisdiction to
do so, where a claim of fraud could not be sustained, would have to be established
by statute. In Illinois, the only power granted to the judiciary in that regard is
the jurisdiction to grant an absolute divorce: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 1.
92 Ill. (2d) 451, 118 N. E. (2d) 433 (1954).
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obtained a default divorce on the ground of desertion under a
decree which waived the plaintiff's right to alimony but was silent
as to the rights of the defendant. Subsequent thereto, a petition
was filed by the defendant requesting an allowance of alimony
upon highly equitable grounds. The trial court entered the re-
quested order, basing its authority to do so upon the present
Illinois statute which allows a subsequent award of alimony even
though the rights so to do was not reserved in the original divorce
decree. 10 The husband, claiming that his constitutional rights
had been impaired, appealed directly to the Supreme Court but
that tribunal took the position that, as the provision in question
provided for notice and an opportunity to be heard, the statute
was consistent with due process requirements and valid. It,
therefore, approved the award of alimony.
The decision in Hurt v. Hurt1 establishes the fact that one
under an obligation to pay for child support can only terminate
that obligation upon a proper application to the court ordering
the support, even though rights of visitation had been impaired
or denied. The plaintiff there concerned had obtained a divorce
with custody of the minor child and a weekly sum for its support.
She subsequently removed the child from the jurisdiction without
court permission, whereupon the defendant father ceased making
support payments. When the plaintiff petitioned to recover the
arrearages, the defendant answered that, under the circum-
stances, his obligation under the decree had been automatically
terminated. The lower court upheld the defendant's argument
but, upon appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District,
the judgment was reversed on the ground the mere absence of
the child from the jurisdiction did not terminate obligations
under the decree and that a parent, in such a situation, would
have to appear before the court and seek a modification of the
decree if he desired to secure relief.
Also related to parental rights and obligations is the
converse obligation of the child to aid in the support of the parent
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 10.
11351 Ill. App. 427, 115 N. E. (2d) 638 (1953).
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which formed the prime issue in the case of Shaver v. Brierton.12
The case was unusual in that the suit was one instituted by the
plaintiff against her brother in an attempt to procure contribu-
tion from him for money she had expended in support of an
indigent mother. While the common law did not recognize any
such responsibility as was there sought to be enforced, many
states, including Illinois, have altered this view by statute. The
Illinois statute'8 specifically provides for the enforcement of
the statutory obligation by means of a suit begun by certain
designated public officials but says nothing about the right of one
child to sue another for contribution. The Appellate Court for the
Second District, however, held the statute to be sufficiently broad
to support a proceeding of the type in question and it affirmed a
judgment awarding contribution.
Infants rights also received some attention during the year
with the result that the Supreme Court, in Amann v. Faidy,4
reversed the position it took over fifty years ago 5 on the question
of the right of an infant to maintain a suit to recover for injuries
sustained prior to birth and, by the decision therein, placed Illi-
nois on the side of a growing minority view which permits suits
of that character. In view of the protection which the law affords
to property and similar rights given unborn children, the court
said it was inconsistent not to recognize actionable rights for
physical injuries negligently inflicted prior to birth. By contrast,
in Burstein v. Milliken Trust Company,16 the Appellate Court
for the Third District went back over fifty years to strike down
an adoption decree, on which the parties had relied and under
which a partial distribution of an estate had been made to the
12 1 Ill. App. (2d) 129, 117 N. E. (2d) 298 (1954), noted in 32 CHIcAGo-KENT
LAW REVIEW 334.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 439-2.
14 415 Ill. 422, 114 N. E. (2d) 412 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVIW
230, 3 DePaul L. Rev. 257, and 42 Ill. B. J. 244, reversing 384 Ill. App. 37, 107 N.
E. (2d) 868 (1952).
15 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900).
16350 Ill. App. 462, 113 N. E. (2d) 339 (1953). The Supreme Court, on leave to
appeal, reversed the decision for failure to accord a trial de novo in conformity
with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 487, but did not examine into the question
as to the validity of the adoption proceeding: 2 Ill. (2d) 243, 118 N. E. (2d) 293
(1954).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
supposedly adopted child, when it was made to appear that the
natural mother of the child had given no consent to the adoption
because of her insanity and, as the law then read, could not, for




REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
On the subject of the acquisition of present rights by way
of title to land in Illinois, it might be noted that when the Illinois
Supreme Court undertook to examine into the background situa-
tion which could lead to a conveyance in the form of a joint
tenancy,' so as to permit the finding of a resulting trust of some
sort which could operate to contradict the normal consequence
of a joint tenancy, it opened the door to unsettling influences
which might have been prevented had the parties been held to the
strict form of the conveyance utilized. Two more illustrations of
this fact are provided by the cases of Paluszek v. Wohlrab2 and
Merschat v. Merschat. In each of these cases, a conveyance in
joint tenancy form, under which the surviving joint tenant claimed
full ownership of the property, was attacked by a person claiming
through the deceased joint tenant in an effort to show, by the
nature of the contribution made by each of the grantees at the
time of acquisition, that no true joint tenancy had arisen, as a
consequence of which a resulting trust ought to be declared. In
the first case, it was urged that, because the nominal joint tenants,
a brother and sister, had furnished unequal portions of the pur-
chase price, they should be treated more nearly as tenants in
17 Compare the holding therein with the more recent decision in People ex rel.
Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill. (2d) 511, 121 N. E. (2d) 781 (1954), not in the period of
this survey, wherein the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 4-1,
and Ch. 23, § 209, were held-constitutional and sufficient to authorize a guardian,
appointed for the purpose, to give consent to an adoption in a case where one of
the natural parents was mentally ill. These provisions, of course, were inapplicable
to the situation presented in the principal case as they were not added to the
statute until 1953.
1 See Kane v. Johnson, 397 Ill. 112, 73 N. E. (2d) 321 (1947).
2 1 In. (2d) 363, 115 N. E. (2d) 764 (1953).
3 1 Ill. App. (2d) 429, 117 N. E. (2d) 868 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
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common enjoying fractional shares in the same proportion but
the court, absent any basis for inferring the existence of a gift
between the parties, nevertheless sustained the joint tenancy as
being one which had been deliberately chosen by the grantees
to effectuate their purpose.
In the other case, wherein certain business premises had
been acquired by two brothers under a land trust agreement as
joint beneficiaries but not as partners, in which building one
of the brothers operated a drug store, the widow of the druggist
brother succeeded in establishing her contention that, by reason
of the contributions she had made toward the cost of acquisition,
she was entitled to assert an interest in the premises as against
her brother-in-law who had claimed the whole thereof as the
surviving joint tenant. If either case indicates anything, it would
be that parties who are about to take title in joint tenancy, except
where an inference of a gift might arise, should preserve com-
plete and independent proof of the entire circumstance and of
their purpose so as to make resort to litigation unlikely or
unsuccessful. If they do not, they will take a chance that the joint
tenancy arrangement may prove to be a futile one.
Two other cases may be said to be of minor importance.
In the case of Chicago Park District v. Downey Coal Company,4
certain general real estate taxes had become a lien on real estate
between the filing of a petition for condemnation of the property
and the time when an award was entered. The amount of the
award was deposited with the county treasurer with the condem-
nor arguing that the award should be reduced by the tax so levied.
The Supreme Court, however, held that, while title would not
vest in the condemnor until the award was determined and paid,
the title so vested would relate back to the date of the filing of
the petition, with the tax burden as between the new and former
owners being determined in accordance therewith. 5 The difficulty
4 1 Ill. (2d) 54, 115 N. E. (2d) 223 (1953). The proceeding rested on Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 1.
5 In a prior decision, that of City of Chicago v. McCausland, 379 Ill. 602, 41 N.
E. (2d) 745 (1942), the same result had been reached in a condemnation proceeding
brought under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 84.
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experienced in making merchantable title under a deed issued
pursuant to a tax sale is illustrated by the case of Gaither v.
Lager.6 In that case, the plaintiff's assignor had purchased the
defendant's land at a tax sale conducted under the provisions of
the so-called Scavenger Act. 7  Plaintiff thereafter served statu-
tory notice on the defendant and then brought an action for pos-
session, with the Supreme Court reversing a judgment for plain-
tiff because the notice did not disclose the year or years in
which the taxes had been assessed nor did it show whether the
land was sold for general taxes or special assessments.
Aspects of conveyancing law were considered in three recent
cases. The first, that of Petta v. Host,9 concerned a deserted
wife who appeared some three years after her wandering hus-
band had died and claimed an interest, as spouse, in real estate
which had passed from the hands of a devisee to the defendant,10
a bona fide purchaser for value. The Supreme Court affirmed a
decision of the lower court which was adverse to the wife on the
ground that the defendant had acted in good faith, had paid a
valuable consideration, and had a right to rely on the public
records in the probate proceeding which gave no hint of the
widow's interest.'1
An interesting and novel legal problem involving the Illinois
statute relating to frauds and perjuries 12 confronted the Illinois
62 Ill. (2d) 293, 118 N. E. (2d) 4 (1954).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 716a.
8 Ibid., Ch. 120, § 744. In such notice, plaintiff Is required to state, among other
things, "for what year [the lot] was taxed or specially assessed."
91 Ill. (2d) 293, 115 N. E. (2d) 881 (1953), noted In 32 CMCAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 271, 1954 Ill. L. Forum 162.
10 Plaintiff actually claimed two parcels of land. The first was conveyed out by
the deceased before his death. As to this parcel, the widow could only assert a
dower claim which the court said was stale for failure to affirmatively perfect the
right in accordance with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 171. The second
parcel passed by decedent's will. As to this, the widow asserted an interest as
heir pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 168.
11 The case finds support In the holding In Ecklund v. Jankowski, 407 IMl. 263,
95 N. E. (2d) 342 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 265 (1951),
wherein a bona fide purchaser prevailed over the rights of a devisee in a subse-
quently discovered will.
12 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, §§ 1-2. Section 2 requires a writing in order
to charge one on a contract for the sale of land. Section 1 makes the same require-
ment for contracts not to be performed within one year.
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Supreme Court in the second case, that of Rose v. Dolejs.'3 The
plaintiffs there had entered into a contract to purchase certain
real estate, the price to be paid in three installments. Before the
second installment became due, the residence on the premises
was destroyed by fire. Plaintiffs and the vendor thereupon
orally agreed to extend the time of the second payment, and
to accelerate the third payment, in order to permit the plaintiffs
to devote their resources to a rebuilding of the residence. The
vendor thereafter assigned his interest to the defendant who,
when the original date of the second installment arrived without
payment, declared a forfeiture. Plaintiffs sued to restrain de-
fendant from interfering with their possession. The enforce-
ment of the agreement as an oral modification of a real estate
contract would ordinarily have entailed no difficulty 14 but, when
the agreement was construed by the court to be an independent,
oral contract, it then fell afoul of the one-year clause. In a novel
approach to the problem, the Supreme Court held that a detri-
mental reliance by the plaintiffs operated to estop the defend-
ant from asserting the non-compliance with the statute as justifi-
cation for his action.
An illustration of the discretion which a court of equity may
exercise in granting or denying specific performance of a real
estate contract may be found in the third case, that of Kukulski
v. Boda.15 Relief was there denied to a real estate purchaser by
the Supreme Court on the ground that the consideration was
inadequate 0 as well as because of the fact that the vendor was
intoxicated, or otherwise mentally ill, at the time he signed the
contract sought to be enforced.
17
13 1 Ill. (2d) 280, 116 N. E. (2d) 403 (1953), noted in 1954 Ill. L. Forum 153.
14 An oral extension of the time for closing of a real estate deal has been en-
forced on the theory that the original terms of the contract have been waived:
Kissack v. Bourke, 224 Ill. 352, 79 N. E. 619 (1906).
152 Ill. (2d) 11, 116 N. E. (2d) 384 (1954), noted in 1954 Ill. L. Forum 355.
16 The court admitted that inadequacy of consideration alone would not be a
sufficient reason for denying specific performance. The precise point does not ap-
pear to have been previously decided in Illinois.
17 Passing attention might be called to the case of Brothers v. McMahon, 351 Ill.
App. 321, 115 N. E. (2d) 116 (1953), in which leave to appeal has been denied. It
was there determined that a contract to purchase a housing unit in a co-operative
apartment was not a "security" within the meaning of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2,
Ch. 121 %, § 97(1).
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Only two of the cases concerning aspects of the law as it
relates to future interests are worthy of mention here.' 8  The
first, that entitled Community School District No. 4 v. Booth,19
concerned a testamentary trust wherein it was provided that,
upon termination of certain life estates, the residue of the estate
should go to the Board of Education of a certain school district
for the erection and equipment of a school building. It was
claimed that the rule against perpetuities had been violated by
the testator's inclusion of a condition precedent to the effect that
an equal amount had to be contributed by the Board of Educa-
tion,2 0 an event which might not occur within normal time limits.
The Supreme Court held that the condition was one precedent
to enjoyment, not to the vesting of the estate, hence no violation
of the rule against perpetuities had occurred.
The second case, that of Farmers State Bank & Trust Com-
pany v. Mangold,2' 1 was one wherein the Supreme Court struck
down a conditional power of appointment on the ground the con-
dition was devoid of effective meaning. The testator there con-
cerned had devised a life estate to his widow with a remainder
to two named girls "providing they do that which is right," but
otherwise to be distributed as the widow might see fit. The
widow, by will, sought to exercise the power of appointment thus
created by reducing the share of one of the girls and eliminating
the claims of the other in favor of other named legatees and
devisees. The court concluded, after an opinion which tabulated
a large number of cases wherein similar or related conditions
had been imposed, that the testator's language was ineffective to
limit the remainder over, hence the widow was deprived of any
power to deal with the property. The net result, judging by
the purported facts, was to vest the estate in persons whom the
18 Certain other cases in this category are noted hereafter, this section, notes 74
to 78, under the heading of Wills and Administration.
19 1 Ill. (2d) 545, 116 N. E. (2d) 161 (1953).
20 Preferring not to decide whether the rule against perpetuities was applicable
to charitable trusts, the court assumed for purpose of the argument that it was
applicable.
21 415 Ill. 602, 114 N. E. (2d) 797 (1953).
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testator, had he lived, might well have regarded as not being
proper objects for his bounty.
Except for those cases dealing with the law of sales, dis-
cussed elsewhere, 22 little of significance has been determined with
reference to legal doctrines controlling rights in personal prop-
erty. A problem regarding bailments under the Uniform Ware-
house Receipts Act 23 arose in the case of Mercantile Trading
Company v. Roth,24 wherein the bailee, operator of a public
storage warehouse, sought to be relieved from liability for fail-
ure to redeliver all the goods on demand on the ground he had,
prior to issuance of certain non-negotiable storage receipts, ac-
quired an interest in the non-delivered goods. The receipts bore
no notation of the bailee's alleged interest, a statement clearly
required by the language of the uniform statute,25 but it was
urged that this provision applied only to negotiable warehouse
receipts, hence did not control in the particular case. The Appel-
late Court for the First District, deeming the statute to be one
declaratory of a long-established policy to protect depositors
against any temptation on the part of warehousemen toward
overreaching, stated that the statute was applicable to all types
of receipts issued by public warehouses and, the proprietor being
otherwise unable to justify the failure to surrender everything
demanded of him, imposed a judgment against him for the worth
of the missing articles.
There is reason to believe, however, that superficial holdings
of personal property, such as bank deposits, in joint tenancy form
may not always carry with such holdings the normal incidents of
rights of survivorship.2 6 The surviving joint tenant in Holmes v.
MiMs 2 7 was permitted to retain the proceeds of the joint account,
22 See ante, Section II, Contracts, notes 19 to 25.
23 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 233 et seq.
24350 Ill. App. 418, 113 N. E. (2d) 194 (1953).
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 114, § 234, states: "Warehouse receipts
must embody [a statement] . . . if the receipt Is issued for goods of which the
warehouseman is owner, either solely or jointly or in common with others, (of]
the fact of such ownership."
28 Cases relating to joint tenancies in real property are noted above, this section,
notes 1 to 3.
27 1 Ill. (2d) 274, 115 N. E. (2d) 790 (1953).
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against the claim of the widow of the deceased joint tenant that
the arrangement had been set up in fraud of her rights, when it
was made to appear that the fund was the product of the combined
efforts of both of the joint tenants. 2  By direct contrast, it was
held, in the case of In re Schneider's Estate,29 that parol evidence
might be offered to explain the purpose of the parties there con-
cerned in entering into a written joint-tenancy deposit agreement °
and, it being made to appear that the arrangement had been
created solely for the convenience of the decedent who had furn-
ished the entire fund, the survivor was required to account for
the disposition he had made of the proceeds. The holding in the
earlier case of Cuilini v. Northern Trust Companys1 was regarded
as being inapplicable and inappropriate since it tended to dis-
regard the equitable rights of the parties and made the law into
an instrument for unjustice.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
That ancient enigma known as a covenant running with the
land, puzzling to lawyers and students alike, received further con-
sideration in the case of Liberty National Bank of Chicago v.
Vance,32 although the court did not there specifically mention the
term by that name. The case was one in which a lessor sued the
lessee and the lessee's assignee for rent in arrears, taking a de-
fault judgment pursuant to a provision in the lease authorizing
confession of judgment. A petition to vacate the judgment as to
the assignee was allowed because the clause in question was held
not to bind the assignee in the absence of express language to that
effect in the assignment. This result would also necessarily follow
from a logical application of the general principle that a covenant
28 The court refused to consider the possible illegality of the intermarriage of
the joint tenants, made void by reason of the subsequent setting aside of a divorce
between the deceased joint tenant and the plaintiff in the instant action, as having
no bearing on the question before it.
29 Sub nom. Link v. Ralston, 2 Ill. App. (2d) 560, 120 N. E. (2d) 353 (1954).
Leave to appeal has been granted.
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2, requires the joint-tenancy agreement to
be "signed by all said parties" at the time the account is opened.
31335 Ill. App. 86, 80 N. E. (2d) 275 (1948).
32 3 Ill. App. (2d) 1, 120 N. E. (2d) 349 (1954).
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must touch and concern the land if it is to be made binding on
those who come into privity of estate with the lessor.
A much more difficult question was involved in the case of
Pierce v. Pierce,33 a case wherein one of the common lessees
sought to partition a leasehold estate of long-term duration. The
pertinent statute8 4 provided for the partition of "lands, tene-
ments, and hereditaments," which terms would not, in the eyes of
the common law, have included leasehold interests, they being more
nearly in the category of chattels real. The Appellate Court for
the First District, however, noting a number of instances in which
leaseholds had been, by statute, included in the same general
category as real estate, held that the language was broad enough
to permit partition of long-term leaseholds, treating the situation
before it as something akin to an action to dissolve a partnership.
The case of Eilers v. Eilers35 also reaches an unusual result
in a landlord-tenant relationship, although the result might equally
well follow in the wake of any contract of analogous nature. The
defendant in that case had gone into possession of certain premises
under a written lease for one year and continued in possession
for approximately six more years. The landlord then brought
a suit for an accounting for the entire period of the tenancy
only to be faced with a claim that the action was barred by
limitation. Relying on a recent decision of the Supreme Court,
36
the Appellate Court for the Third District first concluded that
the continued possession after the expiration of the written lease
did not constitute a renewal of the old lease but created a brand
new tenancy from year to year. It then followed, almost as a
matter of course, that relief could be had for the period covered
by the written lease as well as for the five years immediately pre-
ceding the filing of the suit,8 7 but that the action pertaining to
the intervening period was barred since it was not based on a
33351 Ill. App. 336, 115 N. E. (2d) 107 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 265. Leave to appeal has been granted.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 44.
35 350 Ill. App. 453, 113 N. E. (2d) 191 (1953).
36 See Wanous v. Balaco, 412 Il. 545, 107 N. E. (2d) 791 (1952).
37 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, §§ 16-7.
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written instrument nor had it been revived by the continued
occupation of the premises.
In order to make this part of the survey complete, it should
be noted that the Supreme Court, in Jackson v. First National
Bank of Lake Forest,5 affirmed an earlier decision of the Appellate
Court wherein it had been held that an exculpatory clause in a
lease, designed to protect the landlord from liability for defects
in the premises, would not violate public policy, hence could be
relied on to defeat a cause of action asserted by an injured tenant.
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Issues relating to real estate mortgage security law were
treated in three cases. In two of them, the pertinent questions
called for interpretation of the statute limiting the time for the
filing of foreclosure actions.39 In that connection, it was said, in
the case of Zyks v. Bowen,40 that an action would not be barred,
as between the original parties, provided the debt remained other-
wise enforcible, even though nothing had been done to record the
several written extension agreements. Earlier cases in point,
41
decided prior to 1941, were said to be in no way affected by legis-
lative amendments made at that time. Much the same rationale
was followed in the case of Niehaus v. NiehaUs42 except there the
mortgagee had taken, and kept, possession of the premises for
over thirty years in an effort to remedy the defaults and the
mortgagors had departed from the state and had never returned.
43
A claim of laches, offered to defeat the foreclosure action, was
also rejected.
38415 Ill. 453, 114 N. E. (2d) 721 (1953), noted in 42 Ill. B. J. 241, affirming 348
Ill. App. 69, 108 N. E. (2d) 36 (1952). The Appellate Court holding had been
noted in 32 CHIOAGO-K N LAw REviaw 75.
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, §§ 11 and llb.
40351 I1. App. 511, 115 N. E. (2d) 577 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
41 See, for example, Kraft v. Holzmann, 206 Ill. 548, 69 N. E. 574 (1903). As to
rights of subsequent purchasers, see Gary-Wheaton Bank v. Helton, 337 Ill. App.
294, 85 N. E. (2d) 472 (1949), and McCarthy v. Lowenthal, 327 Ill. App. 166, 63
N. E. (2d) 666 (1945).
422 Ill. App. (2d) 434, 120 N. E. (2d) 66 (1954).
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 19, provides for an exception where the
debtor "departs from and resides out of the state."
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More complicated from the factual standpoint, but not especi-
ally difficult from the legal standpoint, was the issue raised in
the mortgage assumption case entitled Barkhausen v. Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Company.44 It appeared therein
that, following reorganization, a large Chicago office and theater
building had become encumbered as security for a substantial bond
issue in favor of the former bondholders. The operating corpora-
tion, with permission of its shareholders, sold the premises to a
land trust, in which the plaintiffs were beneficiaries, with the trus-
tee thereunder, not individually but as trustee, assuming the pre-
existing mortgage indebtedness. When default occurred and
threats were made to impose personal liability on the plaintiffs
for a contemplated deficiency on the theory that they, being bene-
ficiaries of the land trust, were entitled to manage and control
the property, hence had become personally bound on the indebted-
ness for lack of an exculpatory clause, the plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment as to the nature of their obligations, if
any.45  The trial court, on motion for summary judgment, found
an absence of liability for lack of an express personal assumption
agreement; the Appellate Court for the First District held other-
wise, entering judgment against plaintiffs for the amount of the
indebtedness due, adopting views heretofore expressed in the
case of Schumann-Heink v. Folsom;46 but the Supreme Court, not
in the period of this survey, reversed and reinstated judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs when it concluded that it was the clear
intent of all the parties that the plaintiffs should risk no more
than their initial investment in the property and the use of a
"dummy" or "strawman" in the transaction was clearly ap-
propriate to achieve that purpose. 47 The holding in the case, if
443 Ill. (2d) 254, 120 N. E. (2d) 649 (1954), reversing 351 Ill. App. 388, 115 N.
E. (2d) 640 (1953).
45 The action was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
46 328 Ill. 321, 159 N. E. 250, 58 A. L. R. 485 (1927).
47 A substantial portion of the opinion is devoted to the question as to whether
or not the court could grant relief for an alleged mutual mistake of law, based on
the plaintiff's argument that, if the assumption agreement was binding on them,
it was executed and delivered as a result of such mistake and should be reformed.
While more or less dictum, the opinion expresses some strong views on the subject
which might foreshadow an overturning of the distinction heretofore prevailing
with respect to mistakes of fact in contrast to mistakes of law.
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nothing more, should stimulate an increase in the use of the land
trust device as a means by which to avoid personal liability from
assumption of existing mortgage indebtedness.
Unlike the mechanic's lien situation presented last year in
the case of Samms v. Chicago Title & Trust Company,45 wherein
the contesting lien claimants directed their several claims against
the improved real estate, the more recent case of Robertson v.
Huntley & Blazier Company49 dealt with problems of priority of
lien, as between the federal government on the one hand and some
unpaid mechanics on the other, in a fund of money due from the
owner under a general contract for the improvement of the
premises in question. By the terms of the contract, the owner
agreed to pay the balance of the price on completion of the
project. The general contractor defaulted and was adjudged a
bankrupt at a time when he owed money for work done by sub-
contractors and also for income and other taxes. The federal
government acted first to assert a lien on the contract proceeds
but the sub-contractors, whose agreements antedated the tax liens,
thereafter perfected their mechanic's liens in accordance with
statutory requirements. 50 Upon the filing of an interpleader
action by the owner, accompanied by a deposit in court of the
balance admittedly due, the several claimants presented their
claims with the federal government asserting a priority by reason
of its earlier filing of notice. It was held, however, that the
mechanics were entitled to be paid first inasmuch as their liens,
while inchoate, were "preserved" rather than "perfected" by the
later filing, particularly since the government had no better right
in the matter than the general contractor himself would have been
entitled to assert. As the contractor could have prevailed only
upon furnishing an affidavit that all labor and material had been
paid for in full,51 the government's claim was relegated to the
48349 Ii. App. 413, 111 N. D. (2d) 172 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAw
REviEw 78.
49351 Il. App. 378, 115 N. E. (2d) 533 (1953).
50 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 7.
51 Ibid., Ch. 82, §§ 5 and 32. The building contract In question also contained
a provision to this effect.
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balance of the fund remaining after the mechanics had been paid
and the owner's property had been cleared of potential liens
against it.5
Insofar as security devices in personal property were con-
cerned, notice might be taken of the holding of the United States
District Court in the case of In re Beale,5" which case dealt with
the validity of a chattel mortgage given to secure an installment
note the final payment date on which extended beyond statutory
limits. 54  The court, treating with the problem for the first time
since the statute was last amended, held the mortgage was not
void ab initio and, as a consequence, considered the lien created
thereby as enforcible at least to the extent enforcement was
sought during the statutory period. By inference, it could be
gathered that the lien would be deemed to cease upon the expira-
tion of the statutory period even though the debt might not then
be due.
Some interesting overtones concerning equitable pledges
would appear to be involved in the case of Pliley v. Phifer,55 a case
wherein a liquidating partner agreed to hold the distributive share
of a retiring partner for the benefit of the latter's bank creditor,
already secured by a collateral note, but which arrangement was
attacked by a later judgment creditor of the retiring partner who
attempted to reach the fund so held by a creditor's bill. The de-
cision, however, turned on third-party creditor-beneficiary con-
tract doctrines, so the issue of priority as between the earlier
equitable pledgee and the later legal lien claimant was not con-
sidered"s other than to note that the equitable claimant had ac-
quired vested rights in the fund.
52 The limiting effect of a notice of lien, filed pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 24, is adequately illustrated by the case of Roth v. Lehman, 1 Ill.
App. (2d) 94, 116 N. E. (2d) 413 (1953), where a statement that the sub-contractor
had been hired to provide a cement block foundation was deemed inadequate to
cover a large amount of additional work which, the sub-contractor urged, had been
done pursuant to a subsequent oral authorization.
53 117 F. Supp. 149 (1953), noted In 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVrEw 319.
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 4, fixes a five-year limitation on maturity.
55 1 Ill. App. (2d) 398, 117 N. E. (2d) 678 (1954).
68 On that point, see Robbins, "The Pledge as an Illinois Security Device," 31
CHICAGO-KENT LAw R'vIEw 99-140, particularly pp. 116-7.
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Lenders operating under trust receipt devices, particularly
those lending on the security of automobiles, should give par-
ticular attention to the case of Mori v. Chicago National Bank.
57
It was there held that lenders of that character would be denied
the right to assert estoppel against a true owner, in case money
had been loaned to and trust receipt security taken from the bailee
in possession of an automobile, so long as the owner had done
nothing more than surrender possession of the car to the bailee
and particularly so where the owner had retained the certificate
of title.58 The lender was there said to be negligent in relying
on the bailee's oral representation of ownership without making
resort to the certificate of title as a readily ascertainable means
of determining whether the assertion was a true one or not.
TRUSTS
In refreshing contrast to the rigid rules of proof required by
the Supreme Court for the establishment of resulting trusts59
are the pronouncements of the Appellate Court for the First
District in the case of Merschat v. Merschat.60 Although the
court there denied any intention to relax the stringent rules
heretofore required, it did actually indicate, in the opinion
therein, that a preponderance of evidence leading to a reasonable
conclusion that a resulting trust had come into being would be
sufficient to support the declaration of the existence of such a
trust. It was also there pointed out that a realistic conception of
modern real estate transactions, wherein many of the incidents of
title are frequently held by Istrawmen" or nominees, should lead
to a proper understanding and weighing of the admonitions found
in earlier decisions with respect to the proof required in resulting
573 Ill. App. (2d) 49, 120 N. E. (2d) 567 (1954).
58 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95/, § 76, requires that a certificate of title
be obtained as a condition prerequisite to a license to operate the car but the statute
does not expressly make the certificate evidence of ownership, as is true in some
states.
59 See, for example, the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Ill. (2d) 319 at 324, 115
N. E. (2d) 617 at 619 (1953).
601 Ill. App. (2d) 429, 117 N. E. (2d) 868 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
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trust cases. Ideas to the effect that real estate was the principal
source of wealth and political power and that a conveyance of real
estate "constituted a ceremonial of great dignity and impor-
tance,"61 were said to be notions which could no longer be upheld
in this day and age.
Some cases dealing with charitable trusts deserve mention. In
the case of Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Murr,62 the Supreme
Court determined, for the first time in this state, that a deed con-
veying land for use as a cemetery operated to create a charitable
trust so as to make it clear that a condition in the deed which
prohibited alienation of the property would be valid. The court
there distinguished the case before it from one for the establish-
ment of a trust for the upkeep of a private grave. As the latter
trust would lack public character, it could not qualify as a charit-
able trust. Other interesting discussions of charitable trusts, as
well as of the cy-pres doctrine, may be found in the cases of Com-
munity Unit School District v. Booth63 and First National Bank
of Chicago v. King Edward's Fund.
64
Questions pertaining to the proper administration of a trust
or the scope and extent of a trustee's powers often form a source
of litigation. In that regard, a problem of first impression was
decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Barnhart v. Barn-
hart6 5 The issue was there raised as to whether a person having
a contingent interest in a trust estate was entitled to demand an
accounting from the trustee at any time as a matter of right. The
court answered in the negative, declaring that the scope of the
contingent remainderman's interest would be confined to the pro-
tection and preservation of the trust property, permitting a suit
against the trustee only if some waste or mismanagement can
be charged. According to the decision of the Appellate Court in
61 1 Ill. App. (2d) 429 at 440, 117 N. E. (2d) 868 at 873.
623 Ili. (2d) 107, 120 N. E. (2d) 4 (1954).
631 II. (2d) 545, 116 N. E. (2d) 161 (1953).
641 I1. App. (2d) 338, 117 N. E. (2d) 656 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
65 415 I1. 303, 114 N. E. (2d) 378 (1953).
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the case of In re Gleeson's Will,66 however, there is no reason in
law why a testator may not appoint a contingent remainderman
to act as testamentary trustee if that should be his wish. The case
of Hallin v. Hallin6 7 would also indicate that a trustee may lease
trust property only for the duration of the trust, unless a lease for
a longer term is expressly authorized, would be reasonable under
the circumstances, or is essential for the proper administration
of the trust.
The one remaining case, that of Anderson v. Elliott,6" found
the Appellate Court reiterating two well-known exceptions to the
general rule that the beneficiaries under a trust are necessary
parties in all suits by or against the trustee and involving the
trust property. The first exception pertains to those instances
where the beneficiaries, although not made parties, are properly
represented in the proceedings by the trustee, or by other persons,
so that their interests receive adequate protection. The second
exception exists in those cases where the number of beneficiaries
is so great that the expense and delay of bringing them all into
court would be burdensome. If, in such a situation, the trustee
representing them is made a party, direct participation by the
beneficiaries in the proceedings will not be necessary yet a decree
affecting their interests would be considered binding upon them.
WILS AND ADMINISTMATION
The difficulties involved in drafting will provisions which
clearly reveal the testator's intention have been illustrated by
two recent cases. In the first, that of Brunt v. Osterlund,69 a spe-
cific legacy was made and immediately followed by a provision
that the bequest would be forfeited should the legatee contest
the validity of the will. When the legatee failed to appear and
defend an otherwise unsuccessful will contest suit, the executrix
661 Ill. App. (2d) 409, 117 N. E. (2d) 792 (1954).
67 2 Ill. App. (2d) 118, 11 N. E. (2d) 612 (1954).
68 1 Ill. App. (2d) 448, 117 N. E. (2d) 876 (1954).
69 351 Ill. App. 556, 115 N. E. (2d) 909 (1953), noted in 32 CHMCAGO-KENT LAW
REmVW 272.
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argued that this circumstance should result in a forfeiture of the
legacy. The Appellate Court for the Second District, rejecting
this contention, decided that the forfeiture provision referred only
to affirmative action, hence did not become operative under the
negative conduct involved in the case. A more subtle problem of
construction came before the Appellate Court for the Third Dis-
trict in the case of In re Yocom's Estate.1 0 The testatrix there
concerned had executed a codicil to that clause of her will dealing
with the payment of debts which amendment directed that a rea-
sonable amount be paid to a daughter to cover care and support
provided for the testatrix. Having permitted the statutory period
for filing a claim to pass without filing any claim, the daughter
then sought to share in the estate in regard to the expense of sup-
port as a legatee. Finding no authority in Illinois, the court relied
heavily upon the decision in a Missouri case,71 leading to the con-
clusion that the testatrix had not intended to make her daughter
a legatee in this connection.
Even though the testator's intention is clear, the court may, in
at least one instance, refuse to enforce the provisions of the will
if the circumstances make enforcement unreasonable. Such was
the holding in the case of Fischer's Estate v. Fischer,72 wherein
the testator directed burial in one cemetery and the widow, in
ignorance of the clause, had buried testator in another. The Ap-
pellate Court for the First District affirmed lower court dismissal
of a petition by the executrix to disinter the body, partly because
the court to which the petition was addressed lacked jurisdiction
in the matter.78
In instances where the intention is not as clear as in the last-
mentioned case, rules of construction are alluded to in order that
the court may determine what the testator meant by the words
he used. One such rule of construction declares that, in the
70 2 Ill. App. (2d) 472, 119 N. E. (2d) 819 (1954).
71 Rowe v. Strother, 341 Mo. 1149, 111 S. W. (2d) 93 (1937).
72 1 Ill. App. (2d) 528, 117 N. E. (2d) 855 (1954).
73 It was indicated that a probate court would have no general equitable juris-
diction over the interment or disinterment of human bodies whereas a circuit
court, exercising original equitable powers In the matter, would have constituted
the proper forum for the controversy.
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absence of a plainly manifested intention to the contrary, the
words "heirs at law," when used in a will, are words used to
designate those persons who will answer this description at the
death of the testator and this will be so even where a gift of a
life estate precedes the bequest to the heirs at law.74 The two
late cases of Barnhart v. Barnhart75 and Sloan v. Beatty76 would,
however, appear to have cast doubt on the application of this
rule. In the first case, the testator, by will, established a trust in
favor of his widow and son. The will provided that, in the event
the son predeceased the widow, the corpus of the trust, upon the
death of the widow, was to go to the descendants of the son, but
if there were none, then to testator's heirs at law. The son pre-
deceased the widow leaving no descendants. Collateral heirs
claimed that the term "heirs at law" should be determined at the
termination of the widow's life estate. The widow maintained that
she was entitled to the corpus of the trust because the phrase
"heirs at law" described the heirs of the testator at his death and
she, being such an heir, would take in preference to more distant
relatives named in the statute of descent and distribution. The
Supreme Court rejected the widow's argument and held that it
was the intention of the testator that the words "heirs at law"
should mean those of his heirs who were living at the time of the
termination of the life estate in the widow. There is doubt whether
the will in question expressed a plain intention to this effect,
particularly since there is authority for the proposition that, when
a life tenant is also one of the heirs of the testator, this fact would
not establish an intention to exclude the life tenant from the class
designated to take the remainder.
77
The rule of construction referred to above was further limited
in the second of the cases, that of Sloan v. Beatty.78 The testator
there had devised a life estate to his wife and, upon her death,
74 Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433, 28 N. E. 751 and 34 N. E. 254 (1891).
75 415 Inl. 303, 114 N. E. (2d) 378 (1953).
76 1 Iii. (2d) 581, 116 N. E. (2d) 375 (1953).
77 See Smith v. winsor, 239 Ill. 567, 88 N. E. 482 (1909), cited with approval in
Himmel v. Himmel, 294 Ill. 557, 128 N. E. 641 (1920).
78 1 Il1. (2d) 581, 116 N. E. (2d) 375 (1953).
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to his children in fee-tail, which, by operation of law, gave the
grandchildren of the testator a remainder interest. The will fur-
ther provided that, if none of testator's grandchildren survived
their parents, then the property was "to go to the nearest next
of kin." This phrase was construed as an executory devise limited
after a vested remainder in fee. The court assumed the phrase
to refer to testator's next of kin and then ruled that it was the
testator's intention that "nearest next of kin" should be con-
strued to mean those answering the description at the termination
of the last life estate. When so holding, the court conceded that
the will was ambiguous to the extent that construction was re-
quired but denied an application of the rule that use of the phrase
"heirs at law" should designate those who answered that descrip-
tion at the death of the testator. The rule was said not to apply
for two reasons: (1) the rule applied to "heirs at law" and was
not in point in a case involving "nearest next of kin," and (2) the
word "then" as used in the will was an adverb of time, denoting
when the next of kin were to be determined, and not a reference
designating the event upon which the executory devise was to take
effect.
The case of In re Edwards Estate79 raised an issue as to the
revocability of a joint and mutual will made between husband and
wife in an instance where the will had not been offered for probate
upon the prior death of the wife. The contestants offered evidence
that the will was not valid as to the wife because of incapacity,
arguing that a joint and mutual will which would not be valid as
to one subscriber was not valid as to the other. The court ruled
that evidence to this effect was properly excluded since the will
had not been offered for probate upon the wife's death where the
issue could then have been considered. Finding that the will had
been entered into pursuant to a binding contract, the court was
forced to conclude that it was irrevocable and binding as to the
husband's estate.
Certain aspects of the law pertaining to the administration
of estates were also made the subject of inquiry. The question as
793 111. (2d) 142, 120 N. E. (2d) 32 (1954).
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to whether or not an executor who had been given a power to
sell realty might also grant an easement over the property had
not been decided in this state prior to the holding in Billerbech v.
Collins.0 Chief Justice Schaefer, speaking for the Supreme Court
in that case, recognized the rule that a power of sale would not
give an executor power to mortgage, lease, option or exchange the
property, but held that the executor had an implied power to
create a necessary easement in order to give the intended effect
to the power granted by the testator.
The extent of the jurisdiction of an Illinois probate court
came up for analysis in the case of Quevedo v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Company."' In that case, a federal district court, apparently
without direct precedent in Illinois law, decided that a probate
court had no jurisdiction over a right of action for wrongful death,
other than to assure proper distribution of the proceeds, so it
was held that an order of a probate court approving the settlement
of such a claim, as well as a subsequent order vacating the settle-
ment, was not binding upon the federal court.
The nature of an appeal from an order of a probate court,
generally made the subject of a trial de novo,82 was discussed in
two cases. In the first of them, that of Burstein v. Millikin Trust
Company,18 the Supreme Court indicated that it would be error
for the circuit court to attempt to decide an appeal from the
probate court on motion without first having conducted a hearing
and receiving testimony inasmuch as the circuit court does not
exercise a reviewing function of the nature performed by an
appellate tribunal but is required to grant a complete hearing
without regard to any trial which may have been held in the court
below. In the other, that of In re Brett's Estate,8 4 the Appellate
Court for the Third District held that it would be proper for the
circuit court to award an additional allowance for executor's
803 Ill. (2d) 116, 120 N. E. (2d) 10 (1954).
81 115 F. Supp. 25 (1953).
82 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 487.
83 2 Ill. (2d) 243, 118 N. E. (2d) 293 (1954), reversing 350 Ill. App. 462, 113 N.
E. (2d) 339 (1953).
84 2 Ill. App. (2d) 453, 119 N. E. (2d) 801 (1954).
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attorneys fees from the estate, to cover the work involved in
defending an appeal for trial de novo, on the ground that, while
there is no direct authority in point, it was a matter of simple
equity and fairness that the executor should not be compelled to
bear this expense from his own pocket.
A brief word of warning might be uttered to executors, ad-
ministrators, and the like, based on the holding in the case of
Wessel v. Eilenberger,s5 to the effect that they should not lightly
disregard civil process which may be issued in the individual name
of the legal representative, and served personally, without dis-
closing that such person has also been sued in a representative
capacity. It was there decided that jurisdiction would be acquired,
by a summons of the kind mentioned, over the person named in
both his individual and representative capacity, particularly
where the complaint contained appropriate allegations describing
the defendant in both capacities.
(To be continued)
85 2 Ii1. (2d) 522, 119 N. E. (2d) 207 (1954), noted in 32 CMCAoO-KENT LAw Rm-
v'Ew 341.
